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1.

Introduction

macroeconomics. Traditionally macroeconomists have been interested in explaining time
trends. Some of the strongest trends concern
shifts in the family. Over the course of the
past century in the United States there was
a large decline in the prevalence of marriage
and an increase in divorce, a dramatic drop
in fertility, an upsurge in educational attainment, and a huge rise in married female laborforce participation. Social norms about married female labor-force participation shifted
and attitudes toward premarital sex changed
too. These shifts interest policymakers. Many
questions arise. Should the tax system be designed to favor, or at least not penalize, marriage and/or married female labor-force participation? Should child care be subsidized?
What policies would be beneficial to children
growing up with single or divorced mothers?
Should policies be designed to encourage (discourage) child bearing in countries with low
(high) rates of fertility?

“While the economic approach
to behavior builds on a theory of
individual choice, it is not mainly
concerned with individuals. It uses
theory at the micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the
group or macro level. Rational individual choice is combined with assumptions about technologies and
other determinants of opportunities,
equilibrium in market and nonmarket situations, and laws, norms, and
traditions to obtain results concerning the behavior of groups. It is
mainly because the theory derives
implications at the macro level that
it is of interest to policymakers and
those studying differences among
countries and cultures.” Gary S.
Becker (1993, p. 402)
“One of the functions of theoretical economics is to provide fully
articulated, artificial economic systems that can serve as laboratories in which policies that would
be prohibitively expensive to experiment with in actual economies can
be tested out at much lower cost.”
Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1980, p. 696)

To address these questions one needs economic models, which can serve as Lucasian
laboratories to conduct policy experiments.
Some of the macroeconomics models used in
family economics are the subject of this review. The review starts in Section 2 with a
simple model of married female labor-force
participation, which is used to analyze the rise
in married female labor supply. The model is
also used in Section 2.2 to study the timing
of births along the life-cycle and to investigate the taxation of household income at either
the level of an individual or a couple (separate
or joint taxation). The discussion then moves
onto developing a model of marriage and divorce in Section 3. The framework is employed to examine the fall in marriage and the
rise in divorce. It is also used in Section 3.2
to explain the recent uptick in positive assortative mating, or the trend of people to marry
someone from the same socioeconomic class.
The drop in marriage has been associated with
a swelling of the fraction of children living
with a single mother. The plight of such children is the subject of Section 4. Shifts in social

Think about the important choices that people make in life. A far-reaching decision concerns who to marry. Close on the list is how
many children to have, and how to raise them.
Women, in particular, may be concerned about
trading off their time between working, spending it with their children and husbands, and
leisure for themselves. What one chooses may
be influenced by social norms. Such norms
have prescribed who can work and what is
considered illicit behavior by young children
and adults. Gary S. Becker taught us that
studying this is within the purview of economics.
Aggregating the behavior of individuals to
analyze the economy at large is the subject of
1
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2.

Married Female Labor Supply

housekeeper wife of the past. The world is
different now.
Almost no married women of working age
(25 to 54) participated in the labor market
in 1900. Today, about 75 percent of them
do (Figure 1). The increase in married female labor-force participation displays a Sshaped pattern; the increase was slow initially
and followed by a period of rapid growth that
eventually leveled off. Large increases in female labor-force participation also occurred in
other developed countries (Figure 2). In contrast, the labor-force participation rates for unmarried women of the same ages increased by
a much smaller amount over this period. The
increase was particularly remarkable for married women with young children (less than 6
years old). Their labor-force participation rate
more than tripled between 1960 and 2010.
90
80

Female labor-force participation, %

norms are considered in Section 5; in particular, the shift in norms about married women
working and premarital sex. These norms are
endogenous in the models presented. Next,
models of fertility are reviewed in Section 6.
The review focuses on the decline in fertility
in developed countries and the rise in expenditure by parents on the development of their
children. This is Becker’s famous qualityquantity tradeoff. Attention is also paid to
the enigma of the baby boom and the plunge
in fertility during wars. The discussion is restricted to addressing facts and issues in developed countries.
Finally, before using an economic model for
policy analysis, it must be quantified. Section 7 shows how a macroeconomic model of
the family can be matched with stylized facts
from the data, using the baby boom as an illustration. These stylized facts are generally
moments—means, standard deviations, and
correlations—taken from cross-sectional and
time-series data. They also may include facts
from nonstructural regression analysis. The
model may be matched with the set of stylized
facts using a variety of estimation techniques.
The example here uses a minimum distance
estimation procedure, which incorporates indirect inference.

2
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“Of all historical change in the female labor force, the increased participation of married women has
been the most meaningful...The
movement of married women from
the home to the marketplace has
been accompanied by social and
political change of enormous consequence.” Claudia Goldin (1990,
p. 119).
The entry of married women into the labor
force was possibly the most significant change
in U.S. labor markets during the 20th century. Today’s households are very far from
the stereotypical bread-winner husband and

Married with children
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F IGURE 1. U.S. F EMALE L ABOR -F ORCE PARTICI PATION , 1900-2010
Note: The graph shows the labor-force participation rates
for unmarried women, married women, and married women
who have at least one child under age 6. The sample is restricted to 25- to 54-year-old women.
Source: The U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1900-2000, and
2010 American Community Survey (ACS).

The increase in female employment was accompanied by a decline in the time women
spend in household production. Figure 3
shows time use for men and women between
1965 and 2013. Total market work is defined
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F IGURE 2. F EMALE L ABOR -F ORCE PARTICIPA U NITED S TATES AND W ESTERN E U ROPE , 1960-2010
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Note: The graph plots female labor-force participation for a
select group of countries. The sample is restricted to 25- to
54-year-old women.
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics.

as all time spent working in the market sector on main jobs, second jobs, and overtime,
including any time spent working at home,
plus commuting and break times. For men,
total market work fell from 51 to 38 hours
per week, a drop of 29 percent. For women,
however, the total increased from 23 to 25
hours per week, an 8 percent increase. Total
nonmarket work sums together time spent on
meal preparation and cleanup, doing laundry,
ironing, dusting, vacuuming, indoor household cleaning, indoor design and maintenance
(including painting and decorating), shopping,
and time spent obtaining goods and services
plus time spent on other home production such
as home maintenance, outdoor cleaning, vehicle repair, gardening, and pet care. For men
total nonmarket hours increased from 10 to 13
hours, a 26 percent increase, while for women
they dropped from 32 to 21 hours, a 42 percent
decline. Total market and nonmarket hours
declined for both men and women by about 18
percent. This decline was matched by a rise in
leisure and time spent on child care for both
sexes (the increase in time spent on child care
by mothers is documented in Section 4).

1980
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Year

Year

F IGURE 3. U.S. M ARKET
H OURS , 1965-2013

AND

N ONMARKET

Note: The graph shows total market and nonmarket hours
per week for men and women.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table II) updated with the
2004-2013 American Time Use Survey (ATUS).

1.

Household Production

A simple model of household production is now presented to understand longterm changes in married female labor supply.
Household production treats the home as a
small factory. The home uses inputs, intermediate goods and labor, to manufacture home
goods. In order to formalize these ideas, imagine an economy populated by married couples.
Each person has one unit of time, so the total
time endowment of the household is 2. Suppose the husband always works and spends the
fixed amount lm in the market at the wage rate
wm . The household collectively decides how
much the wife should work. Let l f denote the
wife’s hours in the market. Let w f represent
her wage in the market and
w f =wm be
the gender wage gap.
Households care about the consumption of
market goods, c, and the consumption of
home goods, n. All consumption is a public
good within the household. The household’s
preferences are given by
(1)

U.c; n/ D

ln.c/ C .1

/ ln.n/:
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The household uses intermediate goods, d,
and labor to produce home goods. Think
about d as proxying for the wide range of
products used at home, such as cell phones,
frozen foods, irons, microwaves, computers, refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum
cleaners, Tupperwares, inter alia. Assume that
the household production function has a constant elasticity of substitution form,
(2) n D [ d C .1

lm

/.2

l f / ]1= ;

where the parameter controls the degree of
substitution between intermediate goods and
labor in household production, which is given
by 1=.1
/.
CONDITION 1: (Housework, 2 lm l f ,
and intermediate goods, d, are “substitutes”
in home production) 0 < < 1.
This condition implies that the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods and
housework is high (dubbed substitutes here) in
the sense that it exceeds 1 (the Cobb-Douglas
case). Intermediate goods can be purchased at
the time price w f q; i.e., q measures the goods
price in terms of the wife’s time. Hence, the
budget constraint of a household is

and
wf
c

1
[ d C .1
.1

w f qd:

The household’s optimization problem is
then given by
max f ln.wm lm C w f l f

c;n;d;l f

C.1

/ ln.[ d C.1

w f qd/

Compute the first-order conditions for d and
l f . They are
wfq
D
c
[ d C .1

1
/.2

lm

lf/ ]
d

1

;

1

lf/

:

Assume first that l f > 0. Dividing
these two first-order conditions and rearranging terms, a relation between d and l f can be
established:
d

.1

D

1

/q

1

.2

lm

lm

lf/

l f /:

Note that the function R.q/ is decreasing in
q. By using this equation and the budget constraint, the first-order condition for l f can be
rewritten as
(3)

/.2 lm l f / ]1= /g:

lm

/.2

lf/ ]

The first-order condition for d equates the
marginal cost of buying more intermediate
goods with the marginal utility from consuming the extra home goods that these intermediate goods generate. Similarly, the first-order
condition for l f equates the benefit of more
market hours for the wife with the marginal
utility of consuming less home goods. The
second first-order condition holds with equality if l f > 0: It is possible, however, that the
household finds it optimal to set l f D 0 so
that the wife allocates all of her available time
to home production. This will happen if the
marginal cost of market work is greater than
its marginal benefit.

R.q/.2
c D wm l m C w f l f

lm

/.2

.2
D .1
1

lm

lf/
/.1

lm C l f

R.q/ C .1

/

/

q R.q/.2

lm

lf/ :

(See Appendix A.A1 for the details.) The lefthand side of this expression is decreasing in
l f . The right-hand side is increasing in l f .
So, if an interior solution exists, then it will
be unique.

It is possible that when l f D 0 the left-hand
side of equation (3) is less than the right-hand
side. If so, the household will find it optimal
to set l f D 0 and the wife will not participate
in the labor market.
Now imagine a situation where, due to technological progress, the price of intermediate
goods used in household production declines.
It is easy to show that households will move
away from using labor in household production toward using intermediate goods, a consequence of condition 1. This will increase
women’s market hours. Likewise, it is also
easy to demonstrate that a decline in the gender wage gap (a higher value of ) also leads
to an increase in female labor supply. If
l f D 0, so that the wife is not participating
in the market, then a large enough decline in
the price of intermediate goods or the gender
wage gap will entice her to enter into the labor
market.
PROPOSITION 1: (Married female labor
supply) Married female labor supply, l f , is
decreasing in the price of intermediate inputs,
q, and is increasing in the gender gap, .
[-S HAPED F EMALE L ABOR S UPPLY
The framework described above suggests
a monotonic relation between technological
advance, which results in lower intermediate
goods prices and a lower gender wage gap (a
higher ), and female labor supply. There is
some evidence, however, that the relation between economic development and female labor supply is [-shaped. This relationship is
illustrated in Figure 4 for a panel of countries.
Consider a simple extension of the model
presented above. Assume that households
still care about market consumption, c, and
home goods, n. Home goods are produced
with the household production technology described earlier. The household, however, faces
a fixed cost of household maintenance, denoted by c. Imagine that c captures the bare
necessities that a household needs, such as accommodations or basic furniture. The house-

5
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F IGURE 4. E CONOMIC D EVELOPMENT AND
F EMALE L ABOR -F ORCE PARTICIPATION FOR A
PANEL OF C OUNTRIES , 1890-2005
Note: The figure plots the relation between log GDP per
capita and female labor-force participation for a panel of
countries. The fitted line is FLPD 514:45
118:05
lnGDPC7:21 lnGDP2 .
Source: Olivetti (2014).

hold’s problem is to maximize
U.c; n/ D

ln.c

c/ C .1

/ ln.n/;

subject to the budget constraint
c

c D wm lm C w f l f

w f qd

c

and the household production technology (2).
Following the same steps as above, it can be
shown that the first-order condition for an interior solution for l f is given by
.2

(4)

lm

lf/

R.q/ C .1

/

D .1
/.1
/
wm l m c
Clf
[
wf
q R.q/.2 lm l f /]:

If c D 0, then only the gender wage gap
matters for married female labor supply in
the sense that a proportional increase in both
w f and wm does not affect l f . Suppose that
w f D aw and wm D bw, where w is in-

FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE

terpreted as the general level of wages, and
D a=b is the gender wage gap. When
c D 0, changes in w will not affect female
labor supply, since the income and substitution effects from a change in the general level
of wages exactly cancel out. When c > 0,
however, this is not the case anymore. Suppose that wm lm > c, so that the husband’s
income covers the basic necessities of life, a
reasonable assumption. Now, a general increase in wages, or a rise in w, will cause l f
to decline because the income effect from a
general wage change dominates the substitution effect. A higher value of w increases the
term .wm lm c/=w f D blm =a c=.aw/ D
lm =
c=.aw/. This causes the right-hand
side of equation (4) to shift up, which will result in a smaller value for l f . A narrowing of
the gender gap, due to a lower b or a higher a,
reduces lm =
c=.aw/, so l f will move up.
PROPOSITION 2: ([-shaped married female labor supply) Suppose w lm > c. Married female labor supply, l f , is decreasing in
the general level of wages, w, and the price of
household inputs, q, and is increasing in the
gender gap, .
When wages are low, the fixed cost of household maintenance, c, makes the marginal utility of market goods high. As wages increase,
the household is better able to cover the cost of
household maintenance and married women
can work less. This effect becomes muted
as c=w gets small. This explains the downward portion of the [. What about the upward portion? To address this, suppose that
at some point in time the price of intermediate
inputs declines and/or the gender gap narrows
(so that rises.) These forces lead to a rise in
married female labor-force participation.
D ISCUSSION
The economic analysis of female laborforce participation began with the pioneering
works of Mincer (1962) and Cain (1966). The
massive rise in female labor-force participation over the course of the 20th century has

6

interested labor economists. Costa (2000) and
Goldin (2006) provide historical perspectives.
Much attention has been devoted to examining the extent to which the rise in real wages
and the narrowing of the gender gap can account for the rise in female labor-force participation. The classic reference on the gender wage gap is Goldin (1990). Goldin (1995)
presents some evidence that female labor supply has a [-shaped pattern over time. She
suggests that women have a comparative advantage in service sector jobs. Therefore, the
structural transformation from manufacturing
to services could be behind the rising part of
the [-shaped pattern. Ngai and Petrongolo
(2014), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) and
Rendall (2014) present models that explicitly
link the rise of the service sector to the increase in female labor-force participation and
the declining gender wage gap. The declining
part of the [-shaped pattern can be linked to
the modernization of agriculture and the growing importance of manufacturing. When the
level of agricultural technology is low, women
need to work hard to cover the subsistence
level of consumption, c. A recent discussion
on the [-shaped female labor supply hypothesis is provided by Olivetti (2014).
Figure 5 shows how the gender wage gap
changed during the 20th century. In 1900,
a female worker earned about 50 percent of
what a man did, and by 1970 this number had
risen to only 60 percent. Today the observed
gender wage gap has shrunk to about 75 percent. A caveat is in order. The gender gap may
be due to many things, not just discrimination.
It may reflect differences in educational attainment and occupational choice. There is also a
tendency for women to experience career interruptions, to take part-time jobs, or to refuse
overtime so that they can keep free time for
raising children, another form of work. Also,
women may prefer to earn lower wages in exchange for better benefits, such as child care,
parental leave, and sick leave. Researchers
have found that adjusting for such factors reduces significantly the measured gender gap.
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Blau (1998) and Blau and Kahn (2000) provide surveys of the literature.
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F IGURE 5. T HE U.S. G ENDER WAGE G AP, 19002010
Note: The gender wage gap is defined as the ratio of female
to male wages. For the 1940-2010 period, the sample is restricted to females over age 18.
Source: The numbers for 1900, 1920 and 1930 are from
Gollin (1990, Table 3.1). For 1940-2010 period, the U.S.
Decennial Censuses for 1940-2000 and the 2010 American
Community Survey (ACS) are used.

Galor and Weil (1996) present an interesting general equilibrium model in which the increase in women’s wages and labor-force participation is a by-product of the process of
development. In their analysis, capital accumulation in the market sector raises women’s
wages relative to men’s. The underlying
mechanism is that capital in the market sector is more complementary to women’s labor
than it is to men’s labor, since it displaces
the need for physical strength. Consequently,
capital accumulation will lead to greater increases in women’s wages than men’s wages.
In a similar vein, Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2015) argue that decreases in the gender
wage gap can account for increases in average
hours worked by married women from 1950 to
1990. The negative relation between the gender wage gap and female labor-force participation also holds in cross-country data. This
is shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 6 for

a set of developed economies.
The economic importance of household
production was probably first recognized in a
classic book by Reid (1934). She carefully reported and analyzed the uses of time and capital by households of the era. The data was
fragmentary then. Reid (1934) knew in theory
that labor-saving household capital could reduce the amount of time spent on housework,
but the just-emerging evidence at the time suggested that this effect was modest (see Table
XIII, p. 91). Important research by Aguiar and
Hurst (2007) puts together different time use
surveys for the United States to obtain a picture of what has happened to time allocations
over the last five decades. Figure 3 updates
their numbers. Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla
(2012) document similar trends for other industrialized countries.
In a classic paper, Becker (1965) develops the modern approach to household production: the treatment of the household as a
small factory or plant using inputs, such as
labor, capital and raw materials, to produce
some sort of home goods. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and Greenwood and
Hercowitz (1991) introduce household production theory into dynamic general equilibrium models in order to study the movement
of labor over the business cycle. The idea is
that in favorable economic times households
may temporarily move labor out of the home
sector to take advantage of goods market opportunities, thereby increasing the elasticity of
married female labor supply. Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000) use a similar framework to investigate whether household production can explain cross-country income differentials. This is very much in the spirit of
Reid (1934).
Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu
(2005) illustrate how labor-saving appliances
and intermediate goods can encourage married female labor-force participation. They
embed a Becker-Reid household production
model into a dynamic general equilibrium
model. They also document the decline in the

prices of household durables during the 20th
century. The Second Industrial Revolution
marked the beginning of the 20th century.
This era is most often associated with the
spread of electricity, the automobile and the
petrochemical industry. But, perhaps just
as important was the rise of central heating,
dryers, electric irons, frozen foods, indoor
plumbing, refrigerators, sewing machines,
washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and
other appliances now considered fixtures of
everyday life. The adoption of appliances
was spurred on by a rapid drop in their prices.
Quality-adjusted time prices declined, for
example, by about 8 percent per annum for
refrigerators and 6 percent for dishwashers
between the 1950s and the 1980s. The decline
for other appliances, such as microwaves, was
even larger.
Empirically, female labor supply is negatively associated with the price of household appliances, as shown by Cavalcanti and
Tavares (2008) in a panel of OECD countries. Heisig (2011) looks at a wider set of
countries and finds, using a direct measure
of appliance diffusion, that household technologies are an important force behind increasing female labor-force participation. The
right-hand panel of Figure 6 shows the relation between this measure of appliance diffusion (termed an automation index) and female
labor-force participation for a group of developed countries. Female labor-force participation is much higher in countries with widespread use of household appliances. Likewise,
Coen-Pirani, Leon and Lugauer (2010) document, using U.S. Census micro data, that a significant portion of the rise in married female
labor-force participation during the 1960s can
be attributed to the diffusion of household
appliances. Similar evidence is provided by
Dinkelman (2011), who studies the effect of
rural electrification in South Africa.
2.

Female Labor Supply over the Life Cycle

As married women entered the labor market in greater numbers, their life-cycle pattern

8
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F IGURE 6. G ENDER G AP AND H OUSEHOLD T ECH NOLOGIES VERSUS F EMALE L ABOR -F ORCE PAR TICIPATION FOR A C ROSS S ECTION OF C OUNTRIES
Note: The left-hand panel shows the cross-country relation
between female labor-force participation (ages 15+) and the
gender wage gap, the ratio of female to male wages. The
right-hand panel shows the cross-country relation between
the diffusion of household appliances and female labor-force
participation (ages 15+).
Source:
The automation index is taken from Heising
(2011). The gender wage gap numbers are from Pissarides
et al. (2005) and female labor-force participation is based on
World Bank Development Indicators.

of labor-force participation also changed. In
the 1950s and 60s, women tended to participate in the labor force before their childbearing years, reduce their labor-force participation once they had children, and then perhaps
return to the labor force later (see Figure 7).
The dip in female labor-force participation associated with child bearing has disappeared
in recent years. Today it follows the typical
\-shaped pattern over the life cycle. What
factors can explain these changes? A simple
life-cycle model of female labor supply along
the extensive margin will be presented. To fix
ideas, a static model of the extensive margin
will be developed first.
The economy is populated by married couples. Each household member has one unit
of time. Suppose again that the husband always works a fixed amount of hours, lm , at
the wage rate wm . The household collectively
decides whether the wife should work or not.
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l f D l f , and decide which path to take. Suppose first that the wife does not work. Let
V~ WORK .w f ; wm / be the utility for a household in this scenario. It is given by
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F IGURE 7. U.S. F EMALE L ABOR -F ORCE PARTICI PATION ALONG THE L IFE C YCLE , 1900-2010
Note: The figure charts the labor-force participation rates of
married women at different ages for 1960, 1980, 2000, and
2010.
Source: The U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1960-2000, and the
2010 American Community Survey (ACS).

If the wife enters the labor force, she has to
work l f hours. Hence, this decision is discrete. The household cares about the consumption of market goods, c, and each party’s
leisure. Consumption, including leisure, is a
public good. The household’s utility function
is
U.c; n; / D

ln.c/ C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f /;

where 1 lm and 1 l f denote the leisure
enjoyed by the husband and the wife, respectively. (One could also think about 1 lm
and 1 l f as time spent in household production.) The variable
governs the value
that a couple places on the female’s time spent
at home. It differs across households. Some
households value the female’s time at home
more (a higher ) than others. In particular,
assume that is distributed across households
in the society according to some cumulative
distribution function 3. /.
The household will compare the utility associated with each option, namely l f D 0 and

lm /:

If the woman does not work, then the household enjoys c D wm lm in consumption. The
husband’s leisure is 1 lm , while the wife
spends all her time at home.
Similarly, let VWORK .w f ; wm ; / be the
utility that the household will realize if the
woman works. It reads
VWORK .w f ; wm ; / D ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /:
A working wife brings more income into the
household, so consumption is higher: but the
household suffers a utility loss in terms of
leisure since .1
/ ln.1 l f / < 0. The
higher the value of , the greater is the utility
cost of the woman working. As a result, while
the indirect utility function V~ WORK .w f ; wm /
does not depend on [since .1
/ ln.1/ D
0], VWORK .w f ; wm ; / is decreasing in .
These indirect utility functions are portrayed
in the upper panel of Figure 8. The threshold
value for that makes a household indifferent
between the woman working or not is
b D a[ln.lm C l f /

ln.lm /];

where a
[ =.1
/]= ln.1 l f / > 0 and
is the gender wage gap.
The woman will work in a household with
a value of below b. The fraction of women
working in the society is given by 3.b/, as
illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 8. It
is immediate that the threshold, b, and married female labor-force participation, 3.b/,
are both increasing in w f and decreasing in
wm , while an equal percentage change in both
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has no effect. Indeed, any factor that increases the benefits of joint work, VWORK relative to V~ WORK , as shown by an upward shift
in VWORK in Figure 8, will increase b and the
female labor-force participation rate. Exactly
how much depends on the shape of 3. /.

F IGURE 8. T HE D ETERMINATION OF M ARRIED F E MALE L ABOR -F ORCE PARTICIPATION ALONG T HE
E XTENSIVE M ARGIN
Note: The upper panel illustrates V~ WORK .w f ; wm / and
VWORK .w f ; wm ; / and the determination of the threshold,
b. The lower panel illustrates how the threshold, b, determines the fraction of married women that work. It is as0 <w .
sumed that w0f > w f and/or wm
m

Now, suppose a household lives for two periods. Assume that in the second period both
the man and woman work. In the first period, each household has to decide whether or
not the woman should work. Introduce two
new elements into this environment. First,
each household has a child attached to them
in the first period. Children are costly, both in
terms of time and money. All women need
to spend a fixed amount of their own time,
lc , for child care. This time cost comes out
of the mother’s leisure and captures both the
cost of childbearing and child care. Women
cannot work for some period of time after
birthing a child. Pregnancies can also result in
temporary or permanent debilities, much more
so when medical technology is not advanced.
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Child care also involves a fixed time cost for
mothers, especially if they are breastfeeding.
Additionally, if the household decides that the
woman will work, then the family also has to
buy child care at the price pc per unit of time
the mother works. This cost simply reflects
the fact that someone has to take care of the
child when both parents are working. Assume
that a mother who stays at home can take care
of her child while enjoying her leisure.
Second, there are returns to experience for
women. If a woman decides to work in the
first period, then her second-period wage is
greater than her first-period wage by a factor
of , so that second-period wage is w f .1C /:
If she decides not to work, then her secondperiod wage is simply w f . There are no returns to experience for a man, so his wage is
wm in both periods. Finally, households discount the future at rate 2 .0; 1/.
Take a household in which the wife does not
work. The household’s utility will be
V~ WORK .w f ; wm ; / D ln.wm lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 lc /
C [ ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f /]:
The woman has to incur the time cost lc for
childbearing and child care, independent of
whether she works or not. Consider now the
case where she works. In this case, the household will enjoy
VWORK .w f ; wm ; / D ln.wm lm Cw f l f l f pc /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 lc l f /
C [ ln.wm lm C w f .1 C /l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f /]:
On the one hand, since the wife is working, the

FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE

household has to pay l f pc for child care. On
the other hand, a two-earner household enjoys
a higher income in the first period. Furthermore, by working in the first period, the wife
earns a higher wage next period.
Again, there will be a threshold value for
that separates households with working
and non-working wives (in the first period).
Note that now both V~ WORK .w f ; wm ; /
and VWORK .w f ; wm ; / are decreasing functions of . The indirect utility function
VWORK .w f ; wm ; /, however, has a steeper
slope than V~ WORK .w f ; wm ; /, since ln.1
lc l f / < ln.1 lc /. As a result, a unique solution for the threshold value of still exists.
The threshold value for is given by
b D b[ln.lm wm C l f .w f

pc // ln.lm wm /]
C b [ln.wm lm C w f .1 C /l f /
ln.wm lm C w f l f /];

where b [ =.1
/]=[ln.1 lc / ln.1
lc l f /] > 0. Note that @ b=@ lc < 0:
PROPOSITION 3: (Married female laborforce participation) Married female laborforce participation, D 3.b/, is (i) increasing in the return to labor-force experience, ,
and (ii) is decreasing in the personal time required by a mother for child care, lc , and the
price of child care provided by others, pc .
In an economy in which children are costly
and the returns to work are low, women will
tend to stop working during their childbearing years. They will reenter the labor market
once their children are older. This pattern will
start to change as the cost of children declines
or the returns to experience increase. First,
it will be easier for women to combine work
and children. Second, it will be too costly for
women to stay out of the labor market. Both
forces will operate to entice women to work
more during their childbearing years.
T IMING OF B IRTHS
The same forces that affect married
women’s incentives to participate in the labor

11

market will also shape their incentives about
whether or not to have children and when to
have them. Consider the latter problem here.
Let married couples live for two periods. Assume that both the husband and wife work for
both periods, so there is no labor-force participation decision for the wife. Each household
can have one child. They decide whether to
have this child in the first or (if possible) second period.

Children live for one period and give the
household a utility level . Some households
value children more than others. Let be distributed among households according to the
cumulative distribution function 4. /. Suppose further that fecundity declines with the
age of the household. All households who
want to have a child in the first period can have
one with certainty. If the household delays
fertility until the second period, then they can
have a child with probability : Beyond biological factors, the probability is affected
by the state of medical technology. Hence,
parents have an incentive due to declining fecundity to have their children sooner rather
than later. Having a child early, however, is
costly for mothers. If a household has a child
in the first period, the wage of the mother is
w f in both periods. If the household decides
to wait, the second-period wage of the mother
is .1 C /w f . Here, again,
captures the
returns to experience. The basic idea is that
mothers, even if they participate in the labor
market, might have to take leave from work
or reduce effort at their jobs. This hurts the
growth in their wages. The lower wage growth
of mothers can also be due to discrimination.
Set all other costs associated to childbearing
to 0; i.e., pc D lc D 0. Then the lifetime utility associated with early childbearing is given
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by
VEARLY .w f ; wm ; / D ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f / C
C [ ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f /];
while if the household decides to have their
children in the second period, they enjoy
VLATE .w f ; wm ; / D ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f /
C [ ln.wm lm C w f .1 C /l f /
C .1
/ ln.1 lm /
C .1
/ ln.1 l f / C ]:
There will be a threshold level of joy from
children, b, such that all household with >
b will have their children in the first period.
Suppose, for simplicity, that lm D l f ; so both
husbands and wives work the same hours in
the market. Then, the threshold level b is
given by
bD

[ln.1 C .1 C / /
1

ln.1 C /]

;

where again D w f =wm represents the gender wage gap. This threshold is increasing in
both and . It is immediate that if D 0,
then all children will be born in the first period. If
> 0, however, a positive fraction of children will be born in the second
period. The number of children arising from
period-one and period-two births are given by
1 4.b/ and 4.b/, with the total number of
children being 1 4.b/ C 4.b/.
PROPOSITION 4: (Timing of births) The
ratio of late to early births, 4.b/=[1 4.b/],
is increasing in fecundity, , and the returns
to experience, . The total number of children

born, 1 .1
/4.b/, is decreasing in the
returns to experience, .
TAXES
The analysis so far has abstracted from
taxes. Taxes on the extra income that a wife
generates, however, can be an important deterrent to female labor-force participation. To
illustrate this, consider again the static, oneperiod model of female labor-force participation with the following twist. Suppose the
husband faces a proportional income tax rate
of 1 , while the wife’s income tax rate is 2 .
If 1 D 2 , then both the primary earner
(the husband) and the secondary earner (the
wife) face the same tax rate. Alternatively, if
2 > 1 , then the secondary earner is taxed
at a higher rate than the primary earner. This
would be the case, for example, in the United
States, where husbands and wives are taxed
jointly. The unit of taxation is the household, and tax liabilities are determined by total
household income. As a result, the extra income that the secondary earner brings home is
taxed at a higher marginal tax rate than the primary earner. Since taxes are progressive, the
secondary earner faces a higher tax rate than
she would in a world with separate taxation.
The utilities connected with one and twoearner households are given by

ln.wm lm .1

1 // C .1

lm /

/ ln.1

and
ln.wm lm .1
C .1
/ ln.1

1 / C w f l f .1

l f / C .1

/ ln.1

2 //

lm /:

The threshold value for that determines a
married female’s labor-force participation is
now
b. 1 ;

2/

D a[ln.lm .1

1 / C l f .1
2 //
ln.lm .1
//];
1
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where again a
[ =.1
/]= ln.1 l f / >
b
0. It is trivial to see that @ . 1 ; 2 /=@ 2 < 0.
Thus, higher taxes on the secondary earner
lower married female labor-force participation. In contrast @b. 1 ; 2 /=@ 1 > 0, so
higher taxes on the primary earner will encourage women to work due to the negative
income effect.
Like taxes, the transfers that households receive can also affect married female laborforce participation. Many governments, for
example, subsidize households’ child-care expenditures. Recall that in Section 2.2 households with a working mother incurred childcare expenses in the amount pc , which was
subtracted from the household’s income. With
a subsidy, pc would be replaced with .1
s/ pc , where s is the subsidy rate. Higher subsidies would increase the threshold level of
and married female-labor participation.
H OUSEHOLD BARGAINING
The above analysis assumes that all goods
are public. Furthermore, husbands work a
fixed amount of time, lm . Consider now a
more general setup where the household maximizes a weighted sum of the husband’s and
wife’s utilities. Also, let the household decide
on the hours worked both by the husband and
the wife. In particular, consider the optimization problem given by
(5)

max

c;lm ;l f

C .1

[ ln.c/ C .1
/[ ln.c/ C .1

/ ln.1
/ ln.1

lm /]
l f /];

where
c D wm lm C w f l f ;

and is the husband’s weight in the objective function. Consumption, c, is still a public
good. (Note that the weights on ln c sum to
one.) Now, 1 lm and 1 l f represent the
leisures enjoyed by the husband and the wife,
respectively, and these are evaluated according to the weight placed on each party’s utility
function.

The first-order conditions for lm and l f are
given by
wm
D .1
c

/

1
1

lm

;

and
wf
D .1
c

/.1

/

1
1

lf

:

These two conditions imply
(6)

1
1

wf
lm
D
lf
wm 1

:

Suppose that
is constant and the gender
wage gap declines; i.e., w f =wm increases.
Then, the relative leisure of the husband, .1
lm /=.1 l f /, will rise. The household, which
is maximizing the sum of utilities, finds it optimal to allocate more leisure to the husband
since the wife’s work in the market is now
more productive. As a result, the higher gender wage gap implies more market hours for
the wife relative to her husband.
The wage gap between men and women
has narrowed significantly in the United States
during recent decades. Husbands, however, do
not appear to have seen their leisure increase
relative to their wives. How can this be reconciled with the above framework? One possible answer is that =.1
/ might shift over
time. In particular, if declines over time,
then .1 lm /=.1 l f / could stay the same
or drop, even if the gender wage gap shrinks.
How could change?
Imagine a world in which the husband and
the wife use a cooperative bargaining solution, in particular Nash, to determine lm and
l f , with divorce (or say single life) as their
threat points. Let B and G denote these threat
points for the husband and the wife, respectively. Then, the Nash bargaining problem is
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given by
max f[ ln.c/ C .1

c;lm ;l f

ln.c/ C .1

/ ln.1
/ ln.1

lm /
lf/

B]
G g:

The Nash bargaining solution is Pareto optimal. Therefore, there exists a value of such
that solving the Nash bargaining problem is
equivalent to maximizing a weighted sum of
the couples’ utilities, as given by (5).
Let c , l f , and lm represent the optimal decisions associated with the Nash bargaining
problem. As shown in Appendix A.A2, the
weight, , is given by
D

.H

W G
B/ C .W

G/

;

where W
ln.c / C .1
/ ln.1 l f / and
H
ln.c / C .1
/ ln.1 lm / denote
the value of being married for the wife and the
husband. A higher outside option for the wife,
due to, for example, a smaller gender wage
gap (a bigger w f =wm ), will imply smaller values for . This will, following equation (6),
lead to a fall in .1 lm /=.1 l f /. As a result, .1 lm /=.1 l f / can remain constant
even if the gender wage gap declines. More
generally, different modes of interaction between husbands and wives and assumptions
about the marriage market will lead to different solutions for . A reasonable presumption
is that if a marriage is formed, the value for
used in the Pareto problem (5) yields a level of
utility for each party that (weakly) dominates
what they could obtain in single life.
D ISCUSSION
Different features of the simple two-period
model of female labor supply developed in
Section 2.2 have been analyzed in the literature within more realistic multi-period lifecycle models. The importance of labor market experience for female labor-force participation and wages were emphasized by, among
others, Altug and Miller (1998), Eckstein and

Wolpin (1989), Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011),
and Gayle and Golan (2012). Miller (2011)
estimates that a year of delay in motherhood
is associated with a 9 percent increase in the
total earnings of women between ages 21 and
34. Olivetti (2006) documents that between
the 1970s and 1990s there was a significant increase in the returns to experience for women,
the term above, in the United States. She
also studies how changes in the returns to experience can account for the disappearance of
the dent in female labor supply profiles during
childbearing years.
Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos
(2008) build a model that combines several
factors: the returns to experience, , childcare costs, pc , and the gender wage gap, :
They document that child-care costs relative
to female earnings declined significantly in
the data between the 1980s and 1990s. They
argue that this decline, together with a rise
in the returns to experience for women and a
lower gender wage gap, contributed to both
higher female labor-force participation and its
changing shape over the life cycle. Eckstein
and Lifshitz (2011) estimate a dynamic
life-cycle model of female labor supply to
analyze different forces behind the rise in
married female labor-force participation and
employment during the last 50 years. They
find that the rise in education levels accounts
for 33 percent of the increase in wages
and the narrowing of the gender wage gap
accounts for another 20 percent, while about
40 percent remains unexplained by observed
household characteristics.
They attribute
the unexplained portion to cohort-specific
changes in preferences or the costs of child
rearing and household maintenance.
Family labor supply, the joint behavior of
husbands’ and wives’ labor supplies along
both the extensive and the intensive margins,
also plays a key role in determining earnings
inequality across households, as well as the
ability of households to smooth idiosyncratic
income shocks. Married female labor supply
is highly elastic. As a result, a given increase
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in wage inequality among married women will
translate into an even higher level of earnings
inequality among married households. This
magnification of inequality occurs because the
married women who receive a positive wage
shock will work more than those that don’t.
The increase in household inequality will be
even larger if husbands and wives face shocks
that are positively correlated.
Hyslop (2001) studies the link between rising wage inequality and family earnings inequality for two-earner families in the period
from 1979 to 1985. He shows that labor supply responses by women can account for 20
percent of the rise in family earnings inequality. The insurance provided by family labor
supply is studied by Blundell, Pistaferri and
Saporta-Eksten (2016). They estimate a lifecycle model with two earners making consumption and labor supply decisions: most of
the insurance against permanent wage shocks
is provided by family labor supply, while savings and transfers play a relatively secondary
role.
Uncertainty in finding a new job or loosing
an existing one, in face of labor-market frictions, constitute an important part of shocks
that households face. Guler, Guvenen and Violante (2012) analyze the joint search problem
of couples and how it differs from the singleagent search problem, which dominates the
literature on search and matching in the labor
market. Since families pool their resources, an
unemployed married person with an employed
partner can be more picky about labor market opportunities than a single person. On the
other hand, a married person might decline attractive job offers that require changing locations, which might not be feasible for the other
party in the household.
Child-care costs still constitute an important barrier for female labor-force participation. Table 1 documents total direct expenditure on child care as a fraction of a working mother’s pre-tax income for those families
that make child-care payments. For a collegeeducated mother, child-care costs for children
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under age 5 claim more than 20 percent of her
income. For households with fewer resources,
the picture is more bleak. A family with less
than $1,500 in monthly income spends almost
half of the mother’s income on child care.
The total cost of children, of course, far exceeds what households spend on child care.
Table 2 shows total spending on a child as
a fraction of household income by household
structure, household income, and the age of
the child. The expenses are calculated for the
younger child in a two-child family.1 The total
expenditure on a child was about 24 percent
of household income for a two-parent family
whose yearly income is less than $61,530 in
2013. Expenses increase only slightly with the
age of the child. Independent of the child’s
age, housing constitutes about 30 percent of
these expenses (Lino, 2014). As a child ages,
parents spend less on child care and education (e.g., about 23 percent for children ages
0 to 2 versus 9.4 percent for the ages between
15 and 17), but more on food, transportation,
clothing and health care (e.g., about 40 percent for children between the ages 0 and 2, and
55 percent for children between the ages 15
and 17). Single-parent households, led mostly
by mothers, spend more percentagewise on
a child. Those with a yearly income below
$61,530 spend between 30 to 36 percent of total household income on a child.
Public policies can play a role in mitigating the cost of children for families. Countries differ greatly in how much benefits they
provide to families and the forms these benefits take, as shown in Table 3. Family benefits consist of direct, often means-tested, cash
transfers to families, direct financing or sub1 The amount spent on the younger child in a family depends on family size due to economies of scale. To calculate
the expenses for two children, the figures in Table 2 should
be summed for the appropriate age categories. To estimate
the expenses for an only child, multiply the total expense
for the appropriate age category by 1.25. To estimate the
expenses for a family with three or more children, sum the
expenses for each child, using the appropriate age category,
and multiply by 0.78. For further details on the methodology,
see Lino (2014).
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sidies for child care, early education and residential facilities, and tax benefits targeted to
families, such as child tax credits. Both Denmark (Dnk) and the United Kingdom (UK),
for example, spend about 4 percent of their
GDPs on family benefits. The amounts are
much smaller in Italy (Ita), Spain (Esp) and
the United States. While most of these benefits are in-kind services in Denmark, they
mainly consist of cash transfers in the United
Kingdom. In other countries, such as Germany (Deu) and the United States, tax benefits
are relatively significant. The last column in
Table 3 shows how much governments spend
on child care and early education for children
under age 5. Scandinavian countries (Fin, Nor
and Swe), for example, devote close to 1 percent of their GDPs for child care, which is
more than 25 percent of total family benefits. In contrast, public spending on child care
in Germany and the United States (USA) is
much smaller, less than 0.1 percent of GDP.
Rogerson (2007), among others, attributes the
high levels of female labor supply in Scandinavia to the scope and magnitude of child-care
subsidies there. What would be the effects
of more generous, Scandinavian-style, childcare subsidies on female labor-force participation in countries such as Germany or the
United States? Domeij and Klein (2013) and
Bick (2015) try to answer this question for
Germany, while Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2016) do the same for the United States.
There are of course other policies, besides
child-care subsidies, that affect female labor
supply. Many developed countries, for example, have mandatory parental leave policies,
which specify a minimum amount of leave
time that a person is entitled to in order to
care for a newborn child, with a guaranteed
job after the leave. Erosa, Fuster and Restuccia (2010) study how these policies affect female labor supply and fertility decisions.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) document that
there was a significant reduction in maternal
mortality and morbidity between 1930 and
1960. These reductions lower the fixed cost of
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childbearing, lc . At the same time, infant formula became available and its price declined
dramatically, about 6.6 percent per year between 1935 and 1960. Infant formula provided working mothers an alternative to breast
feeding, again lowering lc . The authors show
that these forces played an important role in
the rise of married female’s labor-force participation.
Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2014) document how federal income tax liabilities vary
with income, marital status and the number
of dependents. The analysis of taxes and
married female labor-force participation follows Kaygusuz (2010) and Guner, Kaygusuz
and Ventura (2012). Kaygusuz (2010) shows
that the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms in the
United States, which lowered the progressivity of income taxes, account for about onefourth of the increase in married female laborforce participation between 1980 and 1990.
Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2012) study
how a hypothetical tax reform, which moves
the U.S. economy from joint to separate taxation, would affect married female labor-force
participation. They model female labor supply along both the extensive and the intensive margins and allow for endogenous human capital accumulation for married women
along their life cycle. As a result, a move to
separate filing, which effectively lowers taxes
for the secondary earner, not only leads to significant increases in married female labor supply, but also results in a smaller gender wage
gap. Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2016) analyze how much cross-country differences in
taxes on the secondary earner contribute to
cross-country differences in married female
labor supply.
Women in all developed countries today
have fewer children than they did decades ago.
In 1970, the total fertility rate was 2.5 in the
United States. Today it is less than 2. Parents also have children later. In 1970, 22.0
percent of all births in the United States occurred to women older than 30. This figure almost doubled and increased to 43.3 percent by

FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE

Career interruptions will be even longer and
more costly in economies with high unemployment, since women will have a harder
time finding jobs. Furthermore, unemployed
mothers will have a harder time covering the
cost of children. Both forces will compell
women to postpone their fertility and lower
the overall fertility rate. Da Rocha and Fuster
(2006) document that there is a positive relation between female employment and the total fertility rate across developed countries today. The right-hand panel of Figure 9 replicates their findings. They build a model
of fertility and female labor-force participation with labor-market search that generates
the observed positive relation between fertility and female labor-force participation. Both
in the data and their model, there is a negative relation between female unemployment
and female labor-force participation. As a re-

sult, in countries, such as Spain and Italy, high
unemployment induces women both to stay
out of the labor force and to have fewer children. The relation between female labor-force
participation and fertility was not always positive, however, a fact noted by demographers—
Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2006). In the
1970s, countries with high fertility rates were
the ones in which female labor-force participation was low. This is shown in the left-hand
panel of Figure 9.
90
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Female labor-force participation, %

2012, as documented by Martin et al. (2013).
Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2002) study a
model of marriage, female labor-force participation and fertility and show that the increase
in the returns to experience for women may
be responsible for this shift in the timing of
births. Section 2.2 captures the key forces in
their analysis. When the wage penalty associated with childbearing is high, women prefer to postpone their fertility and instead first
build their human capital. The parameter in
the analysis captures the fact that female fecundity declines by age. Fecundity declines
slower for males. The implications of differential fecundity between men and women
for labor and marriage markets are studied
by Siow (1998). Diaz-Gimenez and Giolito
(2013) show that differential fecundity is also
important for accounting for the age gap between men and women at first marriage. The
parameter also reflects the state of contraceptive technology. The introduction of the
pill in the 1970s, for example, allowed women
to control their fertility more effectively. The
implications of the pill for the labor supply
and the marriage behavior of women is studied by Goldin and Katz (2002).
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TWEEN THE

Note: The left-hand panel shows the relation between female
labor-force participation (ages 25 and 54) and the total fertility rate for 1975-1980. The right-hand panel shows the same
relation for 2000-2005.
Source: Female labor-force participation, OECD Labor
Force Statistics. Total fertility rate, United Nations (2013).

The analysis of household bargaining in
Section 2.2 follows Knowles (2013). He documents how the relative leisure of men has not
increased over time. Given equation (6) and
the declining gender wage gap, this suggests
that some sort of bargaining model may be
called for. Different models of household decision making are analyzed in Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2014).
The utility value of a woman staying at
home, as reflected by , is treated as a constant
in the current analysis. This does not have
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to be the case. Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti
(2004) present evidence suggesting that a man
is more likely to have a working wife if his
own mother worked than if she didn’t. In particular, men who had mothers who worked in
World War II had a higher likelihood of marrying working women than those who didn’t.
They develop a model where attitudes toward
working women become more receptive over
time. Such forces can be captured by changes
in . A man whose mother worked is modeled
as having a lower than a man whose mother
did not work. As more women start to work,
say due to technological progress, changes in
attitudes will have a reinforcing effect. One
can also imagine that households have some
priors over and update their beliefs. Beliefs
can change as more women enter the labor
force and information grows about the labor
market experience of working women. Fogli
and Veldkamp (2011) and Fernandez (2013)
show that such learning models can generate
the S-shaped increase in married female labor
supply observed in the data.
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Note: The left-hand panel shows the percentage of nonwidowed women (ages 15 and above) who were married.
The right-hand panel plots the crude marriage and divorce
rates (the number of marriages and divorces per 1,000 people).
Source: The data for marriage comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. The data on marriage and divorce rates is from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); viz,
Monthly Vital Statistics Reports for the pre-1996 period and
from National Vital Statistics Report for the post-1996 period.

Marriage and Divorce

To understand the importance of economic
factors in determining marriage and divorce,
consider the facts displayed in Figure 10. A
much smaller proportion of the adult population is married now compared with 50 years
ago. In 1950, 75 percent of women were married (out of non-widows age 15 or older). By
2016, this had declined to 56 percent. Two
factors underlie these observations. First, the
crude marriage rate declined. In 1950, there
were 11 marriages per 1,000 people compared
with just 7 in 2016. Second, over the period
1950 to 2016 the crude divorce rate spiked,
which led a smaller fraction of the population
being married, although the divorce has been
falling more recently. Even today the crude
divorce rate of 3.2 per 1,000 people exceeds
the 1950 value of 2.6.
These trends had noticeable consequences
for the living arrangements of U.S. households. As seen in Figure 11, the fraction of

U.S. households that is married has decreased
continuously, while alternative living arrangements, singles with or without children or persons living with a partner that is not a spouse,
have increased substantially.
At the same time, there has been an increased tendency for people to marry within a
similar socioeconomic class. To see this, consider estimating a regression (using U.S. Census Bureau data) between a wife’s educational
level and her husband’s. In particular, run a
regression of the following form for the years
y D 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005:
w

EDU my

X
C
t2T

D C
X
C
t

h

EDU my

t2T

t

h

EDU my

YEAR t y C" my ,

YEAR t y

with "my

N .0; /.
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IN LIVING ARRANGE -

Note: The graph shows fractions of different household
types for each year: married couples, singles, singles with
children (single mothers and single fathers), and other types
of households (unrelated individuals living together).
Source: The U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1900-2000, and the
2010 American Community Survey (ACS).

h and EDU w represent the years
Here EDUmy
my
of education for the husband and wife in marriage m for year y. The variable YEARt y is a
time dummy. It is set up so that YEARt y D 1,
if t D y, and YEARt y D 0, if t 6D y, where
t 2 T
f1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; 2005g.
The coefficient measures the impact of a
husband’s education on his wife’s education
for the baseline year 1960, since YEARt y D 0,
for all t, when y D 1960. The coefficient t
gives the additional impact of a husband’s education on his wife’s relative to the baseline
year, 1960. The evolution of t over time reflects changes in the degree of assortative mating. The regression also includes a fixed effect
for each year as measured by the constants
and t . The t s control for the secular rise in
the educational levels of the married population. Figure 12 plots the upshot of the regression analysis. As can be seen in the figure,
t rises over time, implying that the degree of
assortative mating has increased.

1.

A Model of Marriage and Divorce

What determines whether a single person
will marry or not? Likewise, whether a married couple will divorce? Two motives for

F IGURE 12.

THE RISE OF POSITIVE ASSORTATIVE

MATING IN THE

U NITED S TATES , 1960-2005

Note: The variable t is a measure of assortative mating
for the years t D 1960; 1970;
; 2000; 2005. A higher
value for t indicates a higher degree of positive assortative
mating. See the text for a description.
Source: Computed from data that is freely available from
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) website.

marriage are stressed here: (i) love and companionship and (ii) economic motives. The
Irish poet Samuel Lover wrote “Come live
in my heart and pay no rent.” It is hard for
an economist to improve on what a poet can
write about love and companionship. The
love between two people will be modeled
here in clinical fashion, as a term in tastes.
Two people living together may have a higher
level of material well being than if they both
lived alone. This could happen because there
are economies of scale both in the consumption of market goods and in the consumption/production of nonmarket ones. Additionally, public policies such as family assistance
or taxation may favor married or single life.
Households can be composed of z 2 f1; 2g
adults. Suppose that each adult has one unit of
time. This can be split between either working
in the market or at home. A z-adult household
will have a total of z units of time. Let the market wage for men and women be represented
by w. Household production is undertaken ac-
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cording to the production function,
(7)

.dz / C .1

nz D

/ .h z /

1=

;

where h z is the household’s labor at home and
dz is the inputs of durable goods into home
production. Suppose that dz can be purchased
at the price wq, where q again measures the
goods price in terms of time. Assume that the
household production function satisfies Condition 1; i.e., 0 <
< 1. This implies that
durables and labor are quite substitutable in
household production in that the elasticity of
substitution exceeds unity (the Cobb-Douglas
case).
Preferences are represented by the utility
function
(8)

Uz

cz
z

C .1

/V

nz
z

C Mz e
b;

where cz and n z denote the household’s consumptions of market and nonmarket goods
and with Mz
I fz D 2g. The utility indexes
Uz and V are
Uz .x/ D ln .x

c=z/ and V .x/ D x = :

With this specification, the constant c, as in
Section 2, is a fixed cost associated with maintaining a household and is the source of scale
economies here. The parameter determines
the curvature of the utility function for the
home good. Finally, to incorporate love and
companionship, suppose that upon meeting
a couple draws a bliss variable, e
b, which is
added to the household’s utility. The variable
e
b can be positive or negative and measures
their degree of compatibility. Assume that this
is a random variable drawn from the cumulative distribution function B e
b .

concave than the natural logarithm function
. D 0/. Thus, marginal utility diminishes
more rapidly for household goods than market goods. As a consequence, as a household
becomes richer it will tend to move consumption toward market goods (in a relative sense).
The optimization problem of a z-adult household is
Wz .w; q/ D max

cz ;dz ;h z

.1
subject to
cz D w .z

cz
C
z
nz
b
C Mz e
/V
z

Uz

qdz /

hz

and the household production function (7).

It is useful, for the sake of exposition, to
define the indirect utility associated with the
maximization problems of single and married households net of the effect of the bliss
e
b: Define then S .w; q/
W1 .w; q/ and
M .w; q/ W2 .w; q/ e
b. The indirect utility functions S and M play an important role in
the analysis. By using the envelope theorem,
it is easy to calculate for future use that
(9)

dS .w; q/
D
dq

w

d1
<0
c1 c

and
(10)

dS .w; q/
dw

1

D
D

w

h 1 qd1
c1 c
1
> 0:
1 c=c1

CONDITION 2: (Strong diminishing marginal utility for home goods) < 0:

For a married household, the analogous analysis yields

The above condition implies that the utility function for nonmarket goods is more

(11)

dM .w; q/
D
dq

w

d2
c2

c

< 0;

FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE

21

and
(12)

dM .w; q/
D
dw
w

1

1
c=c2

> 0:

The allocations of single and married households, fcz ; h z ; dz gzD1;2 relate to each other in
an intuitive fashion.
LEMMA 1: (Household allocations) The
allocations in married and single households
have the following relationships:
(i) .c2 c/ > [.2 c=w/=.1 c=w/] .c1 c/ I
(ii) d2 < [.2 c=w/=.1 c=w/]d1 I
(iii) h 2 < [.2 c=w/=.1 c=w/]h 1 I
(iv) .c2 c/=2 > .c1 c/ and c2 > c1 I
(v) S.w; q/ < M.w; q/:
Now, a married household has 2
c=w
units of disposable time, after netting out the
fixed cost of household maintenance, to spend
on various things. A single household has
1 c=w units of disposable time. So, the ratio .2 c=w/=.1 c=w/ reflects how much
richer in time a married household is, due to
the economies of scale from marriage; i.e., a
married household spends less time working
per person in order to cover the fixed cost of
the household. Lemma 1, Part (i), states that
a married household will spend a larger fraction of their adjusted time endowment on the
consumption of market goods than will a single household. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1
imply that married households spend less than
single households on household inputs, relative to market goods. That is, qd2 =.c2 c/ <
qd1 =.c1 c/ and wh 2 =.c2 c/ < wh 1 =.c1 c/
so that [qd2 C wh 2 ]=.c2
c/ < [qd1 C
wh 1 ]=.c1 c/. When nonmarket goods exhibit strong diminishing marginal utility, bigger households will favor (relative to the consumption patterns of smaller ones) market
consumption for their larger adjusted endowment of time. Part (iv) of Lemma 1 states that
after paying the fixed cost of household maintenance, market consumption per person is effectively higher in a married household than
a single one. Also, married households spend

more on market goods than do single households. Last, as a consequence of (ii), (iii) and
(iv), a married household is better off than a
single one, at least on economic grounds. This
result is due to the economies of scale from
marriage.
A prospective couple will use the following
criteria to determine whether or not to marry:
M ARRY if M.w; q/ C e
b > S.w; q/;
e
S INGLE if M.w; q/ C b < S.w; q/:

The threshold level of bliss, b , that equates
the value of married and single life is given by
(13)

b D S .w; q/

M .w; q/ < 0:

Interestingly, some people will marry for economic reasons even though they do not love
each other (because b < 0). Note that
1 B.b / gives the fraction of the population
that gets married.
F ROM E CONOMICS TO ROMANCE
Is the above framework useful for explaining the decline in marriage since the 1950s?
The answer is yes. To see this, break the economic development process up into two underlying forces: a rise in wages and a decline
in the price for home inputs. Using (9) to (12)
and (13), it is easy to see that
(14)

db
D
dq

w

d1
c1

and
(15)
db
1
D
dw
w 1 c=c1

d2

c

c2

c

<0

1
> 0;
1 c=c2

where the signs of the above expressions follow from Lemma 1.
Technological advance in the form of either
a falling price for purchased household inputs
or rising real wages reduces the economic gain
from marriage. This leads to an increase in
the threshold value for bliss, b . A fall in
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the price of purchased household inputs leads
to the substitution of purchased household inputs for labor in household production. Single households use labor-saving products the
most intensively, so they realize the greatest
gain [i.e., d2 = .c2 c/ < d1 = .c1 c/ in (14)].
The assumption of strong diminishing marginal utility for nonmarket goods ( < 0) is
important for a drop in the price of purchased
household inputs to reduce the economic return to marriage. As wages increase, the fixed
cost for household maintenance matters less.
This fixed cost bites the most for single households [i.e., c=c2 < c=c1 in (15)]. Therefore,
single households benefit the most from a rise
in wages. Equation (15) shows that in the absence of a fixed cost (c D 0) a change in wages
will have no impact on the utility differential
between married and single life. This leads to
the following lemma:
LEMMA 2: (The decline in marriage) The
fraction of the population that is married,
1 B .b /, is increasing in the time price of
durables, q, and decreasing in wages, w.
D IVORCE
The decision to divorce or not is analogous to the decision to get married. Imagine a couple who is married. Their household utility is M.w; q/ C e
b. Suppose that
the couple gets a new draw for bliss, e
b0 ,
0
from the distribution B e
b . Should they remain married? The answer is yes only if
M.w; q/ C e
b0 > S.w; q/. It is easy to add
a cost of divorce into the analysis. Let a divorce costs in units of time per person. The
divorcee’s budget constraint would appear as
c D w.1 h/ wq w . The indirect utility function for a divorcee should be rewritten as S .w; q; /, with dS .w; q; / =d D
w= .c c/ < 0. Now the couple will remain married if M .w; q/ C b0 > S .w; q; /.
The threshold value for a divorce, b 0 , is defined by b 0 D S .w; q; / M.w; q/. Clearly
a drop in the cost of divorce, , will promote
divorce since it raises the value of single life
for a divorcee.
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LEMMA 3: (The rise in divorce) The rate
of divorce, B b 0 , is declining in cost of
divorce, , decreasing in the time price of
durables, q, and increasing in wages, w.

2.

Assortative Mating

To have assortative mating, men and women
need to differ along some dimensions. Assume that there are two types of men: those
with low productivity and those with high productivity working in the labor market. Denote
a man’s productivity level by i for i D 1; 2,
with 2 > 1 . Let there be i men who
have a productivity level of i . Similarly, suppose that women differ in their market productivity as well. Represent a woman’s productivity in the market by j for j D 1; 2,
with 2 > 1 . Additionally, let women also
differ in their productivity at home, h , for
h D 1; 2, with 2 > 1 . Assume that there are
j h women with the productivity combination
. j ; h /. Thus, there are two types of men and
four types of women. Each sex has one unit
of time. To keep things simple, suppose that a
man spends all of his time working in the market while a married woman divides her time
between market work and household production. Normalize the total number of people of
each sex to one; i.e., let 1 C 2 D 1 and
C 22 D 1. For simplicity, assume
11 C
that 22 < 2 and 11 < 1 . Who will
marry whom in this economy? Assume that
all matches are based solely on economic considerations. Clearly, not all men can marry a
woman of the ideal type, . 2 ; 2 /, and not all
women can wed a man of the best type, 2 .
How will matching be done in this economy?
Let the household’s preferences be given
once again by (1). Then the maximization
problem for a marriage between a type- i
man and a type-. j ; h / woman is
M.

i;

j ; h I w; q/

D maxf ln cC.1
d;h

/ ln ng;
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subject to
nD

d C .1

/

1=

hh

and
iw

cD

Cw

j

.1

h/

wqd;

where q is the time price of durables (per efficiency unit of time). It is easy to calculate
that
w
dM
D
> 0;
d i
c
(16)

dM
D
d j

and
(17)
dM
D .1
d h

/

w
.1
c

.1

h/ > 0;

/
n

1
h

h > 0:

An interesting feature to note is that in a marriage the value of a woman’s productivity in
the market, j , depends on how much she will
work there, 1 h. Likewise, the value of her
productivity at home, h , is a function of how
much time she labors there, h.
T HE G ALE -S HAPLEY M ATCHING
A LGORITHM
To characterize the implied matching
process, simply make a list of utilities from
the pairings, starting from the top and going to
the bottom. The best women will be matched
with the best men. Now, suppose that there
are more of these men than women. Then,
some of the men will have to match with the
next-best women on the list. The matching
process continues down the list in this fashion. At each stage the remaining best men are
matched with the remaining best women. If
there is an excess supply of one of the sexes,
the overflow of this sex must find a match on
the next line(s) of the list.
Now, suppose that the kth position on

the list is represented by a match of type
. i ; j ; h /. Some type- i men may have
already been allocated to women that are
higher on the list; i.e., to women that have
a better combination of j and h . Let
k . / be the amount of remaining typeRm
i
i
men that can be allocated at the k-th position on the list. Similarly, let R kf . j ; h /
be the number of available type-. j ; h /
women. The number of matches is given
k . /; R k . ;
by minfRm
i
j
h /g. Recall that the
f
number of people of each sex is one. Thus,
the odds of a match are Pr. i ; j ; h / D
k . /; R k . ;
minfRm
i
j
h /g. Any type- i men
f
that are not assigned a mate at position
k will be available for position k C 1,
and similarly so for type-. j ; h / women.
Thus, the number of type- i men that will
be available for the next position, k C 1,
kC1 . / D R k . /
will be given by Rm
i
i
m
k . /; R k . ;
minfRm
i
j
h /g, while the number
f
of type-. j ; h / women is R kC1
f . j ; h/ D
k
k
k
R f . j ; h / minfRm . i /; R f . j ; h /g. To
1. /
D
start things off, Rm
i
i and
1
R f . j ; h / D j h . The matching process
is described in Table 4. The odds of some
of the matches happening in the table will be
zero. For example, consider a marriage of type
. 2 ; 1 ; 1 /. There will be no type- 2 men
left by the time the algorithm reaches a type. 1 ; 1 /f woman.
T HE R ISE IN A SSORTATIVE M ATING
What can explain the rise in assortative mating? Two things come to mind. First, technological progress in the home. Second, technological progress in the market or reductions
in discrimination that favor market work by
women. If these drivers reshuffle the entries in
Table 4, then a change in the pattern of assortative mating will occur. The discussion here
is heuristic. Take yesteryear as the starting
point in time. Suppose that women do little
work in the market. A high value for implies
that a woman will have a high ranking in the
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table. From (16) it can be seen that, if women
work little in the market (h ' 1), then their
value in marriage will not be affected much
by the value of their market productivity. But,
their productivity at home will matter, as (17)
illustrates. Assume that
M.

i;

1 ; 2 ; w; q/

> M.

i;

2 ; 1 ; w; q/:

Here a man of type i will prefer a woman
who is good at home production and not good
at market work to a woman who is not good at
home production and good at market work.
As the economy changes due to technological progress in the home and the market, so
will the ordering in the table. Take each form
of technological progress in turn.
1) Technological Progress in the Home. Let
the price of home durables, q, fall. This
releases labor from the home. As h falls,
the value that a women’s market productivity has in a marriage will increase.
The position of M. i ; 1 ; 2 ; w; q/ vis
à vis M. i ; 2 ; 1 ; w; q/ in the ranking
would be reversed. Now, a man would
prefer a wife who is not good at home
production and good at market work to
the wife who is good at home production
and not good at market work.
2) Technological Progress in the Market.
Suppose that market forces favor a shift
from brawn to brain. This could be
thought of in two ways. First, a woman’s
productivity in the market, , may rise
relative to her productivity at home, .
Second, it could be viewed as an increase
in the market productivity of women, ,
relative to men, . Both of these forces
will result in a higher level of labor supply, 1
h, by women—see Appendix
A.A4. As a consequence, a woman’s
will matter more relative to her .
The above illustration assumes that a woman’s
productivity at home and in the market are
uncorrelated. Presumably, they are positively

correlated. To the extent that this is true, the
reordering in the table may be more muted.
D ISCUSSION
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) document
some key facts about marriage and divorce
over the last 150 years. A nice survey of the
early theoretical literature on marriage and divorce is provided in Weiss (1997). Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2014) provide an
introduction to the modern theory of marriage and divorce. The first search model
of marriage and divorce was developed by
Mortensen (1988). Greenwood and Guner
(2009) develop a dynamic search model of
marriage and divorce and fit it to match the
trends in these variables since World War
II. (A subsection of the paper examines the
model’s prediction over the entire 20th century). A model of marriage and divorce is used
in Regalia and Rios-Rull (2001) to account
for the rise in the number of single mothers.
They stress market forces, such as a movement in the gender gap, as explaining this rise.
Jacquemet and Robin (2012) estimate a search
and matching model of the marriage market
for the United States. Their analysis focuses
on how female and male wages affect marriage probabilities and the share of the marital
surplus received by partners.
Fernandez and Wong (2016) examine the
implications of a move towards unilateral divorce in the 1970s. They find that this switch
promoted divorce and increased married female labor-force participation. In the current analysis, think about this as a drop in
. In an econometric investigation, Wolfers
(2006) finds that unilateral divorce laws explain very little of the long-run rise in divorce rates. Thus, whether unilateral divorce
laws promoted a rise in divorce is an open
question. Fernandez and Wong (2016) also
find that a reduction in the gender gap barely
changed divorce and led to a small reduction
in the number of married women. It did have
a significant impact on married female laborforce participation. The impact of such laws
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on savings is studied in Voena (2015). She
finds that the unilateral divorce combined with
an equal division of property encourages savings and discourages female labor-force participation. Voena (2015) formulates the allocations within a marriage from a dynamic
contracting perspective. Under the unilateral divorce regime, the Pareto weights in the
married household’s problem [a dynamic analogue to (5) in her analysis] may evolve over
time as one party in the marriage attempts to
keep the other within the marriage by transferring goods and/or leisure to them. Guvenen and Rendall (2015) suggest that changes
in divorce laws also contributed to growing
female educational attainment since education
acts as an insurance against bad marriages for
women. Other public policies affect the value
of single versus married life as well. Since
the unit of taxation in the U.S. tax code is the
household, it penalizes married households
with two earners. Chade and Ventura (2002)
build a search model of marriage and divorce
to study the differential tax treatment of single
and married individuals and show that a move
to individual filing would increase the number
of marriages.
The matching algorithm presented here was
developed by Gale and Shapley (1962), who
characterize stable matching without transfers. Every potential marriage is associated
with a given value utility for each partner.
This utility cannot be transferred between parties. The algorithm matches people together.
The allocation is stable when there is no situation where two people would prefer to be
matched with each other as opposed to with
their current partners. As a special case, suppose men and women differ by a single characteristic, say their labor market productivities,
and . Let M. ; / be the common value of a marriage enjoyed by both parties. It is easy to show that if M is strictly
increasing in both arguments, then the stable Gale-Shapley algorithm will imply positive assortative mating; that is, high- men
will match with high- women and low-

25

men will match with low- women.
An alternative would be to assume that the
utility is transferable; that is, the total utility from a match can be split up between
the partners. Shapley and Shubik (1972)
and Becker (1973) characterize stable matches
when utility is transferable. They show that
stable matching requires efficiency in that it
must maximize total utility summed across
all matches. Becker (1973) presented some
conditions under which there will be positive assortative mating. Again, if agents differ by a single dimension, then positive assortative mating requires that the function M
be supermodular. In other words, if 0 >
and 0 > , then M. 0 ; 0 / C M. ; /
M. 0 ; / C M. ; 0 /. A more thorough
analysis is provided by Browning, Chiappori
and Weiss (2014). It is easy to put randomness into the matching process, such as marital bliss, so that there will not be perfect assortative mating. Choo and Siow (2006) estimate a static transferable utility model of the
U.S. marriage market and show that the gains
to marriage for young adults fell substantially
between the early 1970s and early 1980s.
Burdett and Coles (1999) study assortative
mating within a search framework. They use
a simple framework where agents differ along
a single dimension. In particular, the utility
from a given match for a person is the type of
his/her match. They show that a class structure will arise: Individuals of a given type will
in equilibrium only marry people whose types
fall within a certain range around the individual’s type. As a result, while there is still a
tendency for assortative mating, the cost of
search forces agents to be less picky compared
with a frictionless world. Shimer and Smith
(2000) study a search model with transferable utility and show that the household utility function, M. ; /, needs to satisfy more
stringent conditions than supermodularity for
positive assortative mating to emerge in equilibrium.
Couples may sort on many dimensions.
Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque
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(2012) show that body mass is one such factor. Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) and Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2005) suggest
that positive assortative mating has implications for income inequality and vice versa.
Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos
(2016) illustrate within the context of a structural model how shifts in family formation
(changes in educational attainment, shifts in
the pattern of marriage, and movements in
married female labor-force participation) can
significantly amplify the impact of shifts in
the wage structure on inequality. A distinguishing feature of the analysis is that
the matching probabilities are determined endogenously. Positive assortative mating provides a marriage-market return for female educational investment, in addition to the traditional labor-market return. This is analyzed in
Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009). Eckstein,
Keane and Lifshitz (2016) estimate a model
of family formation, similar in many respects
to Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos
(2016), but they include a fertility decision.
In their analysis, the matching probabilities
are exogenously imposed using the empirical
ones from the data.
The existing empirical literature measures
assortative mating by the correlation, or other
measures of association, between the educational attainments, as in Figure 12, or the
earnings of husbands and wives. In addition
to household income, educational attainment
of individuals can affect assortative mating
both by shaping partner preferences as well
as by influencing the circle of potential partners that one circulates within. One can imagine that assortative mating along a measure
of socioeconomic class that is independent of
one’s education can possibly shed light on
these two forces. Assortative mating along the
lines of parental education or along distinctive
first or last names could provide such a measure of socioeconomic class [see Guell, Rodriguez Mora and Telmer (2015) and Olivetti
and Paserman (2015)].
As an aside, the model above suggests that
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a married woman will do more housework the
higher her productivity is at home relative to
in the market; i.e., the higher is h = j . It
also suggests she will work more in the market the higher her productivity is relative to
her husband’s in the market; i.e., the higher
is j = i . On the first point, Rios-Rull (1993)
inserts household production into an overlapping generations model to examine its impact
on the time allocations of skilled versus unskilled labor. In his framework, skilled labor
(relative to unskilled labor) tends to substitute
market goods or services for labor in household production.
4.

Growing up with a Single Mother

There is no longer the need for nevermarried adults to find a mate and marry for
economic reasons, as in the past. Likewise,
people no longer have to remain, for economic
reasons, in an unhappy marriage. They can
divorce and live alone or find someone else.
There is a downside, though. Children from
single-parent families are less likely to be successful than kids living with both natural parents. This is shown in Table 5. The table
examines various outcomes for a child based
on where they lived between ages 0 to 16. A
two-parent family is defined as a family with
both natural parents present. A single-parent
family is defined as a family with just one
parent present or a family with one natural
parent and one step parent present. A child
is assigned to the category where s/he lived
for the majority of her or his childhood. As
shown in Table 5, children living in singleparent households are more likely than children from two-parent families to drop out of
high school (14.6 percent vs. 9.2 percent), be
idle (25.9 vs. 12.1 percent), experience a birth
before age 20 (32.8 vs. 21.3 percent), and are
less likely to complete college (15.0 percent
vs. 23.6).
What economic factors might be important
in accounting for these differences? Singleparent families have only half the income
of two-parent familes. Recall from Table 2
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1.

A Model with Female-Headed Households

Imagine a world where there are two types
of men and women, those with a high level of
productivity, 2 =2, and those with a low level,
1 =2, so that 1 < 2 . A person earns a wage
based on her/his productivity level on the labor market. The fraction of each sex that is the
low type is . Men and women meet in a marriage market. They sort according to their productivity so that a paired man and woman are
from the same socioeconomic class. The couple draws a marital bliss shock, e
b 2 f b; bg.
The realized value of the shock will take the
low value, b, with probability ". The couple
decides whether or not to marry based upon
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that the cost of raising children for a singleparent family is very high as a fraction of
their income. Additionally, Table 1 showed
that child-care expenses absorbed a significant fraction of a working mother’s income.
Children living with a single mother are much
more likely to live in poverty than those living
within a married household, as the right-hand
panel of Figure 13 shows. A much greater
percentage of female-headed families receive
welfare than married ones do—see the left
panel of Figure 13.
Children in single-parent households also
enjoy less time with their parents. Table 6
shows how much time mothers spend on child
care per week. The upper panel shows total
hours per week, while the lower panel reports
hours per child. The total time spent on child
care increased in recent decades for all groups.
As documented in Section 2, total nonmarket
hours (household work) of women declined
significantly during this period. The numbers
in Table 6 suggest that time saved by better
household technologies was partly used for
spending more time with children. More educated mothers spend more time with their children than the less educated mothers. Finally,
child-care time per child in single-parent families is about an hour less per week than in twoparent families.
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F IGURE 13. H OUSEHOLDS ON W ELFARE (19932005) AND C HILD P OVERTY (2000-2011) IN THE
U NITED S TATES
Source: Indicators of Welfare Dependence, Annual Report
to Congress, 2008, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements.

the realized value of this shock. Regardless of
whether they marry or not, each woman has
two children, a girl and a boy. If the couple
separates, the children always live with their
mother. An adult’s productivity level is influenced by the amount of human capital investment (education) that s/he received when
young. In particular, if a household invests
in their children’s education, then both children will draw the high level of productivity,
2 =2, with probability . If they do not, then
both children will draw the high level with
probability < .
Let a married household have preferences
of the form
ln c C 2

0

Ce
b;

where c is consumption, 0 2 f 1 =2; 2 =2g
represents the productivity level of the children, and e
b 2 f b; bg denotes the level of
marital bliss. Parents care about the success
of their children, as measured by the kids’ productivity. Utility for a single mother is given
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by
ln c C 2 0 :

She does not realize any bliss from marriage.
The preferences for a single man have the
form
ln c:
Since the children do not live with single fathers, it is assumed that the latter does not enjoy a benefit from the former. Therefore, an
estranged father will not willingly invest in his
children because he does not care about them.
Should a household invest or not in educating their children? If a single mother of type i
does not invest in her children, her consumption will be i =2. The expected utility from
her children is then .1
/ 01 C 02 . Alternatively, if she does invest in her children, she
will realize expected utility from them in the
amount .1
/ 01 C 02 > .1
/ 01 C 02 ,
but her consumption will be reduced to i =2
< i =2. Let e D 0 indicate if a household
does not invest in its children (or does not educate them) and e D 1 denote that it does. The
single mother’s decision to invest in her children is summarized by
8
1; if ln i =2
>
>
<
ln i =2
eD
0 ;
.
/ 02
>
>
1
:
0; otherwise.
A single mother will only invest in her children if the gain in utility from improved child
0 /, exceeds the loss
quality, .
/. 02
1
from the drop in her consumption, ln. i =2/
ln. i =2
/. The gain in utility from improved child quality derives from the higher
odds, > , of getting a good draw, 02 > 01 .
The decision for a married household is
very similar:
8
ln i
< 1; if ln i
0 ;
eD
.
/ 02
1
:
0; otherwise.
Note that ln. i /

ln.

i

/ is decreasing in
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i . So, a married household is more likely
to invest in their children because they are
wealthier, i > i =2.

2.

An Equilibrium with Single Mothers

It is easy to construct the following situation
where:
1) Some children will grow up with a single
mother.
2) Children who grow up with single mothers will have on average lower levels of
human capital than those who don’t.
3) Girls who grow up living with a single
mother are more likely to become single
mothers than girls who grow up in a twoparent family.
To construct such an equilibrium, assume
the following conditions:
CONDITION 3: (All married couples educate their children)
ln.

1/

ln.

1

/<
.

/.

0
2

0
1 /:

Observe that if the above equation holds for
a type-1 household, then it certainly holds for
a type-2 one, because ln. i / ln. i
/ is
decreasing in i .
CONDITION 4: (Single mothers do not educate their children)
ln.

2 =2/

ln.

2 =2

/>
.

/.

0
2

0
1 /:

If a high-type single mother chooses not to educate her child, then a low-type one won’t either, since ln. i =2/ ln. i =2
/ falls with
increases in i .
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CONDITION 5: (Couples with the high
bliss shock, b, always marry.)
ln.

1

/ C .1
ln.

/

0
1

1 =2/ C .1

C

0
2

Cb >

0
1

/

C

0
2:

The left side gives the value of marriage for
a type-1 couple which draws the high value
for the bliss shock, b. The right side gives
the value of single life for the woman. The
man will also want to marry if this condition
holds, because the value of single life for him
is ln. 1 =2/. Again, ln. i
/ ln. 1 / is increasing in i , so that if the above condition
holds for 1 , then it also holds for 2 .
CONDITION 6: (High-productivity couples with a bad bliss shock, b, choose to
marry while low-productivity ones do not)

ln.

2

/ C .1
ln.

/

0
2

2 =2/ C .1

C

/

0
2
0
1

b>
C

0
2;

and
ln.

1

/ C .1
ln.

/

0
1

1 =2/ C .1

C

0
2

/

b<
0
1

C

0
2:

When the first condition holds for a type-2
woman, then it will also hold for a type-2
man. Whether the second condition holds for
a type-2 man is irrelevant, since if the woman
doesn’t want to marry, then a union won’t
form.
T HE S TEADY S TATE WITH S INGLE
M OTHERS
Now think of an overlapping generations
model where a person lives two periods,
the first as a child, the second as an adult.
Given the above conditions, type-1 matches
that draw the low value for the bliss shock,
b, will not result in a marriage. The single woman will then pick not to educate

her children—condition (4). Let v denote
the steady-state fraction of low-productivity
adults. By assumption, then, v will not change
over time. It is determined by
D ".1

/ C v.1

"/.1
.1

/C
/.1

/:

To understand this equation, focus on the
right-hand side. There are exactly three ways
a person can become a low-productivity adult.
First, s/he may have had a low-productivity
mother. There are v low-productivity mothers in the population. A fraction " of these
will remain unmarried because they draw the
low value for the bliss shock. Their children will be a low type with probability .1
/. Thus, the number of low-type children
spawned from low-type mothers is ".1
/.
This explains the first term. Second, a lowproductivity mother marries with probability
1 ". Even though the children in her household will be educated, they may still turn out
to be a low type with probability 1
. This
gives the second term. Third, there are 1
high-type marriages in the population. A fraction .1
/ of these marriages will have
low-type children. Therefore, the number of
low-type children arising from high-type marriages is .1
/.1
/. Consequently, the
right-hand side gives the total number of lowtype children, which in a steady state must
equal , or the left-hand side. Solving gives
0<vD

1
1

"[.1

/

.1

/]

< 1:

Taking stock of the situation:
1) The fraction of mothers who are single
is ". Not surprisingly, this fraction is
increasing in the odds that a low-type
mother will not get married, ". This fraction also rises in the probabilities that
children will turn out to be low types,
1
and 1
.
2) The expected level of human capital for
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a child growing up with a single mother
is .1
/ 1 C 2 , which is less than
the expected level of human capital for a
child growing up in a two-parent family,
.1
/ 1C
2.
3) The odds of a girl who grew up with a
single mother becoming a single mother
herself are ".1
/, while the probability of a girl who grew up in a twoparent family becoming a single mother
is ".1
/, where ".1
/ > ".1
/.
3.

Discussion

Economic status is highly correlated across
generations. Corak (2013) and Durlauf and
Shaorshadze (2015) review the extensive literature on intergenerational mobility. Measuring intergenerational mobility is a challenging task that requires panel data that link the
economic status of children to that of their
parents. Guell, Rodriguez-Mora and Telmer
(2015) and Clark (2014) propose a new
methodology for measuring intergenerational
mobility that exploits the cross-sectional data
on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. Clark (2014) documents that
there has been very little change in social mobility over the past few centuries.
A growing body of literature in economics
and other social sciences emphasizes the importance of initial conditions for intergenerational mobility. Carneiro and Heckman (2003)
and Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov
(2006), among others, show that differences
between children, both in their cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, appear at very early ages
and that the family environment plays a significant role in generating these differences.
Furthermore, Cunha and Heckman (2007) and
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) emphasize the importance of early childhood investment for the effectiveness of investment at
later ages. Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011)
calculate that the initial conditions at labor
market entry, ages 20 to 25, can account for
about 60 percent of the variation in lifetime
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earnings—considerably more than shocks received during the working lifetime. Keane and
Wolpin (1997) find an even larger role for initial conditions.
Becker and Tomes (1979 and 1986) and
Loury (1981) constitute the main building
blocks of theoretical research on intergenerational mobility. In the Becker and Tomes
model, altruistic parents, given their preferences and constraints, decide how much to invest in their children. Lee and Seshadri (2014)
integrate the Becker and Tomes framework
into a standard life-cycle economy. Their results suggest that investment in children and
parents’ human capital, rather than the persistence of innate abilities, have the largest impact on intergenerational mobility. Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004) and Caucutt and Lochner
(2012) also study models with multi-period
human capital investment and show that public policies that target early ages are more successful than later interventions.
The plight of children living with a single
mother was documented in a classic book by
McLanahan and Sandefur (1994). Aiyagari,
Greenwood and Guner (2000) build an overlapping generations model with endogenous
marriage and divorce to analyze the impact of
single parenthood on intergenerational mobility. Their analysis combines the Becker and
Tomes model of human capital investment on
children with a search model of marriage. The
analysis is extended to include endogenous
fertility in Greenwood, Guner and Knowles
(2003). Suppose that single women are eligible for a lump-sum welfare payment in the
amount !. From examining condition (6) it
can be seen that this payment makes it more
likely for a low-productivity woman to choose
single life because the value of not marrying
increases to ln. 1 =2 C !/ C .1
/ 1 C 2.
Still, if the payment were large enough perhaps a single mother would invest in her children’s education since now the cost of doing
this is ln. 1 =2 C !/
ln. 1 =2 C !
/,
which is decreasing in !—condition (4). In
a similar vein, suppose that a single father
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has to pay child support in the amount .
This reduces the value of single life for a
low-productivity man to ln. 1 =2
/, so he
would more likely remain married—his analogue to condition (6). This raises the value
of single life for a low-productivity woman
and also gives her more wherewithal to educate her kids. The impact of welfare payments on single motherhood is modelled in
Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2000). In
situations where the household solves a bargaining problem, as discussed in Section 2.2,
the relative weight on the female’s utility in
the household optimization problem may shift
as a result of changes in public policy—see
Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2003).
5.

Social Change

Just as families have changed over time,
so have culture, social norms and social institutions. Clearly, these societal changes influence what happens within families. Likewise, widespread shifts in the structure of
families will have an impact on culture, social
norms and social institutions. The approach
here models both family structure and culture
and social institutions as functions of the economic environment. As the economy changes,
so do family structure, culture and social institutions. The induced changes in family structure and culture and social institutions interact
with each other.
1.

Women’s Rights in the Workplace

Milestones for women’s rights in the United
States are presented in Table 7. This list is far
from complete. It emphasizes topics discussed
here, to wit: married female labor-force participation, marriage and divorce, and reproduction. In 1920 an amendment to the U.S.
constitution granted women the right to vote.
In the same year, the U.S. Department of Labor established the Women’s Bureau. Its purpose was to collect information about women
in the workforce and to improve their working conditions. The Equal Pay Act was passed
in 1963. This act made it illegal to pay a
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woman less than what a man would earn for
the same job. Around the same time, the Civil
Rights Act, Title VII, prohibited employment
discrimination on the basis of sex. The act
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charged with investigating complaints and imposing penalties. In 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ruled that Title VII applied
to jobs with “substantially equal” task requirements for men and women, although not necessarily in title or job description. Title IX of
the Education Amendments, passed in 1972,
banned discrimination against women in education. This facilitated entry into professional
schools, among other things. Employment
discrimination against pregnant women was
prohibited in 1978. Last, in 1986 the Supreme
Court found that sexual harassment on the job
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
2.

A Model of Women’s Rights

A stylized model of the process whereby
women gain rights in the workplace is now
formulated. Imagine an economy populated
by married households, each with two children. Both the husband and wife have one unit
of time. The husband spends all of his time
working in the market at the wage w. The wife
has three potential uses of her time: working at home, spending time with her children,
and working in the market at the wage rate
r w, where r 2 f0; g reflects women’s rights
in the workplace. When r D 0 (no rights)
married women are prohibited from working,
while when r D
1 (equal rights) they
can work at the wage w.2 Here, represents
the gender gap. Even in a world without discrimination, women may be paid differently
than men at a particular point in time. This
could occur because jobs in the past required
2 Think about the situation corresponding with r D 0
as reflecting a world where there is severe discrimination
against women making it undesirable for them to work. This
equilibrium could be supported by a trigger strategy mechanism, whereby people won’t truck with other people who
hire women or other people who do business with people
that hire women.
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more brawn than brains. Labor is indivisible.
A mother must spend the fixed amount of time
h on housework. If the woman works in the
market, then she must work the fixed amount l
there.
The household’s utility function is given by
c C q C q;
where c is the household’s consumption, q is
the quality of the two children, and q is the average quality of children in society. The constant measures how households in society
care about other people’s children, as opposed
to their own, which is reflected by . The
variable is distributed across households according to a uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1]. Thus, some households care more
(less) about the quality of their offspring (consumption) than others. The quality of children
is specified by
q D ln t;
where t is the mother’s time spent with them.
Households also care about the average quality of children in society, q. Low quality children in society may lead to social problems
such as crime, unwanted pregnancies, unemployment and the like.
The household must decide whether or not
the woman should work. The woman’s unit of
time is split between housework, h, working
in the market, l 2 f0; lg, and improving the
quality of the household’s children, t; thus,
t D 1 h l. The household’s decision
amounts to solving the maximization problem
max fw C r wl C ln.1

l2f0;lg

h

l/ C qg;

where l indicates whether the wife works in
the market (l D l) or not (l D 0). With b defined as the threshold value where the household is indifferent between the woman working in the market or not, it is easy to deduce

that
lD

8
<

if < b D 3.r / r w l
= ln[.1 h/=.1 l h/];
:
0; otherwise.

l;

The fraction of women working in society is
just b D 3.r /, which is a function of women’s
rights, r . When r D 0 (an absence of rights)
then b D 3.0/ D 0 and no women will work.

LEMMA 4: (Married female labor-force
participation) The fraction of women working
in society, b D 3.r /, is increasing in women’s
rights, r , and decreasing in the amount of
housework required, h. It is not affected by
the average quality of children in society, q.
Observe that the average quality of children in society, q, does not impact whether or
not the woman in a household works in the
market, at least given the level of women’s
rights, r . It turns out that the level of women’s
rights is influenced by the quality of children,
though, and vice versa. As will be seen, this is
the channel through which the economic environment affects women’s rights.
Goldin (1990) discusses marriage bars that
prevented married women from working.
These were regulations in the first half of the
20th century that barred single women from
working after marriage and that prohibited
employers from hiring married ones. In 1928,
for example, 62 percent of school districts
would not hire married women. This figure
rose to 77 percent in 1942. Private firms had
similar proscriptions.
Suppose that households can vote on a law
that allows married women to work or not.
When women can work, then r D , and
when they cannot, r D 0. For a law to
pass, 50 percent of households must vote for
it. The median voter in society is the household with D 0:5. The law will pass if and
only if the median household is in favor of it.
When women can work, the average quality
of children will be q D b ln.1 l h/ C
.1 b/ ln.1 h/, while when they can’t it
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is q D ln.1 h/, where again b D 3.r / is
the fraction of women who work. A household will only vote for the law, if the wife
will work. It is easy to understand why. If
the wife in the household will not work, then
that household will not gain any income from
voting for the law. But, the average quality
of children in society will fall. So, the household will vote no. If the median household
( D 0:5) votes for the law, then so will all
households with a < 0:5.
The criteria underlying the median household’s vote is straightforward to formalize. If
women can work (a yes vote), the median
household’s utility will be
w.1 C l/ C 0:5 ln.1 l h/
C f3. / ln.1 l h/
C [1 3. /] ln.1

h/g;

while if they can’t [a no vote, which implies
b D 3.0/ D 0], it is
w C 0:5 ln.1

h/ C ln.1

h/:

Notice that the median household cares about
the average quality of children in society,
which is a function of the aggregate level of
married female labor-force participation, b D
3. /. So, the median household will vote yes
if w l
3. / ln[.1 h/=.1 l h/] >
0:5 ln[.1 h/=.1 l h/] and no otherwise.
By solving out for b D 3. /, the decision to
vote yes (r D ) or no (r D 0) to grant women
the right to work can be written as
8
if w l.1
/
<
;
> 0:5 ln[.1 h/=.1 l h/];
rD
: 0; otherwise.
PROPOSITION 5: Women’s rights are more
likely in societies where the requirement for
housework, h, is low and the value of a
woman’s work in the market place, w, is
high. Women are likely to have fewer rights
in society’s that place more emphasis on chil-

dren or where

is high.

Therefore, technological progress in the
home, or a reduction in h, is conducive to the
development of women’s rights. So is technological progress in the market. The latter can
occur due to either an increase in the general
level of wages, w, or from an increase in the
value of jobs that women are suited for as reflected by –say because of a shift away from
brawn to brain.
D ISCUSSION
Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) model
shifts in culture as changes in tastes over
time. They build a dynamic model of culture
in which mothers’ employment affects their
sons’ preferences toward their wife working
or not. In their model, sons with a working mother become less biased against their
wives working. As more women enter the labor force, a new culture is transmitted from
mothers to sons, which leads to even more
women entering the labor force in the next
generation. Empirically, the authors find that
the employment status of a man’s mother has
a significant impact on the likelihood that his
wife works. This is true even after controlling for various characteristics of husbands
and wives, such as education, income, and religion. In followup work, Fernandez and Fogli
(2009) find that second-generation American
women whose ancestors worked in countries
where married female labor-force participation is higher tend themselves to have higher
rates of labor-force participation. Likewise,
second-generation American women tend to
have higher rates of fertility when their ancestors originated from countries where fertility
is higher.
The model of women’s rights in the workplace is inspired by Doepke and Tertilt (2009).
They model the empowerment of women over
time. In their framework, at the start of
time, only the husband’s preferences matter
for household decisions. The world then transits to a situation where both the husband’s
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and wife’s preferences are weighted equally.
Women in their framework value the welfare
of descendants more than men. A man faces
a tradeoff. On the one hand, he would like
to run his own household. On the other, he
would like his daughter to be empowered in
her household. As the return to education increases, it pays for men to empower women
in the household. This result arises because
women care more about children than men.
Consequently, women’s empowerment spurs
human capital investment and increases the
welfare of the lineage. Eventually, this effect
is strong enough so that men favor empowerment. Doepke, Tertilt and Voena (2012) survey the literature on women’s rights. They
note that the extent of female empowerment in
a nation is highly correlated with its income—
see Doepke, Tertilt and Voena (2012, Figure 1). This fact suggests that culture, social norms and social institutions are likely
to be functions of the economic environment.
Miller (2008) discusses how suffrage rights
for women in the United States led to an expansion of public health spending that resulted
in a reduction in child mortality. In a similar
vein, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) find that
increased labor-force participation for women
is associated with larger government. Still,
culture may change slowly. Alesina, Giuliano
and Nunn (2013) show that historical differences in agricultural technology across countries (labor-intensive shifting cultivation done
by women versus capital-intensive plough
agriculture done by men) have left their marks
on the status of women even today.
3.

The Sexual Revolution, 1900-2000

There may be no better illustration of social change than the sexual revolution that occurred during the 20th century. It is an excellent example of how technological progress,
in this case contraception, can lead to a dramatic change in culture. At the beginning of
the past century, only a paltry number of unmarried teenage girls engaged in premarital
sex; 6 percent in 1900 (see Figure 14). By
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the end of the century, a large majority did,
roughly 75 percent in 2002. What caused this
increase? The contraception revolution.
Both the technology for contraception and
education about its use changed dramatically
over the course of the past century. Condoms and diaphragms became more effective,
the birth control pill and IUDs arrived, and
contraception became widely available due to
the establishment of birth control clinics and
changes in laws. Some of these laws are documented in Table 7. In 1936, in the U.S. v.
One Package the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit established Margaret Sanger’s
right to order a pessary (a diaphragm) through
the mail from a doctor in Japan. Similarly, in
1965 the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut struck down a Connecticut law that
banned people from using “any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception.” Estelle Griswold had
opened a birth control clinic. In 1972, a
women’s right to an abortion was affirmed in
Roe v. Wade. These rulings resulted in a dramatic drop in the cost of premarital sex. In addition, the annual failure rate for contraception
fell precipitously. In 1900, following the conventional birth control practices at the time,
a teenage girl would have had a 72 percent
chance of becoming pregnant if she engaged
in premarital sex for the full course of a year.
By 2002, this dropped to 28 percent.
How did societies in yesteryear prevent outof-wedlock births? Providing unwed mothers with material support was a great financial burden for parents, churches, and governments of the time. Societial real incomes were
very low. So, society worked hard to punish young men and women who engaged in
sex outside of marriage. Often, this involved
shaming the people involved. For example,
in 1601 England, the Lancashire Quarter Sessions ordered an unmarried father and mother
of a child to be publicly whipped. The two
then had to sit in the stocks naked from the
waist up with a placard on their heads that
read “These persons are punished for forni-
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Source:
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(2014).

cation.” Even today, the shame an unmarried
teenage girl associates with sex is related to
her propensity to engage in it. A girl who
feels premarital sex is shameful is much less
likely to engage in it, as Table 8 makes clear.
In 2002, only 17 percent of teenage girls (15 to
19 year olds) who thought that premarital sex
would cause shame had sexual intercourse,
compared with 77 percent who felt that it
would not cause shame. In a similar vein, just
31 percent of girls who felt that their mothers would strongly disapprove if they had premarital sex had coitus compared with 81 percent who thought that their mothers would be
agnostic. People’s attitudes are an input into
culture. So, modeling how they are formed
and evolve is important for understanding social change.
4.

A Model of Premarital Sex

Imagine a problem facing a teenage girl.
She is deciding whether or not to engage in
premarital sex. When making the decision,
she rationally calculates the costs and benefits
from this activity. The benefit is joy from sex.
Suppose this is governed by the level of the

girl’s libido, denoted by l (for this subsection).
Let libido be distributed across girls according
to a uniform distribution on [0; 1]. The cost
of the activity is the chance that the girl becomes pregnant. A teenage pregnancy reduces
the odds that a girl will attain a good education, work in a fulfilling job, or find a desirable
partner in the marriage market. Represent the
utility that a girl with an out-of-wedlock birth
will have when she is an adult by Ao , and the
utility that a girl without one will realize by
An . Presume, of course, that An > Ao . Think
about An
Ao as representing the economic
cost of pregnancy. Additionally, assume that a
girl who becomes pregnant will feel shame in
the amount s. The determination of the level
of shame will be discussed later. Finally, even
if the girl engages in premarital sex, she may
not become pregnant. The level of reflects
the state of society’s contraceptive technology.
Let give the odds of safe sex, or not becoming pregnant. Therefore, 1
is the probability of becoming pregnant, or the failure rate.

A T EENAGE G IRL’ S D ECISION M AKING
Direct attention now to a teenage girl’s decision about whether or not to engage in premarital sex. On the one hand, if the girl is abstinent, then she will realize an expected lifetime utility level of An . On the other hand, if
she engages in premarital sex, she will realize the enjoyment l, but will become pregnant
with probability 1
. Her expected lifetime
utility level will be l C An C.1
/ Ao . Additionally, if she becomes pregnant she will
feel shame in the amount s, which must be
netted out of Ao . The teenage girl will pick
the option that generates the highest level of
expected lifetime utility. Her decision can be
summarized as follows:
8
if An l C An
<
A BSTINENT,
C .1
/ .Ao s/;
: S EXUALLY ACTIVE, otherwise.
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P REMARITAL S EXUAL ACTIVITY
How much premarital sexual activity will
there be in society? The threshold level of libido, l , at which a girl is indifferent between
having premarital sex or not is given by3
l D .1

/ An C s

Ao :

This has a nice interpretation. The expression
equates the utility of sex, given by l , with
its expected cost, the difference in future utilities induced by an out-of-wedlock birth, multiplied by the probability of pregnancy. All
girls with an l > l will engage in premarital
sex while those with a l < l will not. The
number of girls experiencing premarital sex,
p, is given by
(18)
p D 1 l D 1 .1
/ An C s Ao :
LEMMA 5: (Premarital sex) The fraction of
teenage girls engaging in premarital sex, p, is
decreasing in the failure rate of contraception,
1
; the amount of shame associated with
an out-of-wedlock birth, s; and the economic
cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, An Ao .
One might expect that girls from a higher
socioeconomic background will have more
to lose from having an out-of-wedlock birth.
That is, An Ao will be larger for girls from a
higher socioeconomic background than for the
ones from a lower one. In fact, in the United
States, the odds of a girl having premarital sex
decline with family income. In the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, for instance,
70 percent of girls between the ages of 15 and
19 in the bottom income decile had experienced it, versus 47 percent in the top one.
S OCIALIZATION BY PARENTS
How is the level of shame determined? Suppose that it is determined by parental socialization. In particular, assume that parents try

to mold their daughters’ psyches when they
are young so that they will be less likely to
engage in premarital sex when they are older.
Parents do this recognizing that their teenage
daughters will do whatever is in their own
best interest. In economic terms, daughters
will maximize their own utilities subject to the
constraints that they face. But, parents can influence the paths that their children will follow as adults by molding their offsprings’ utility functions when they are young. Hence,
the actions a daughter takes as a teen will be
partially based upon the socialization she received when young. To operationalize this
idea, let parents choose the level of shame,
s, to minimize the odds of an out-of-wedlock
birth for their daughter. Shaming is a costly
socialization process. It requires parental effort in terms of instilling sexual mores in a
daughter. The cost function for this is given
by
s 1C1=
; where 0 < :
1 C 1=
Assume that parents do not know the level
of libido that their teenage daughter will have.
The odds of an out-of-wedlock birth are given
by
.1
/ 1 .1
/ .An C s Ao / .
The parents’ decision problem can be
formulated as

min .1
s

1

/ An C s

.1

Ao

C

s 1C1=
;
1 C 1=

where the term governs the disutility parents realize if their teenage daughter becomes
pregnant. The solution to this minimization
problem is
(19)

3 The threshold level of libido must lie between zero and
one. Clearly, it will always be positive since An > Ao . Set
l D 1 whenever .1
/.An C s Ao / > 1.

/

sD

h

.1

/2

i

:

LEMMA 6: (Parental socialization) The
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amount of parental socialization, s, that a
daughter receives is increasing in the failure
rate for contraception, 1
, and in the
parents’ disutility from an out-of-wedlock
birth to their teenage daughter, .
S OCIALIZATION BY C HURCH AND S TATE
Other participants in the economy may
also have an interest in socializing children.
Churches and governments desire to curtail
premarital sex by teenagers. They do this for
both economic and moral reasons. Governments provide welfare for unwed mothers and
their children. Historically, this was a large
expense for the church. Social institutions desire to minimize this expense. Teenage girls
who are religious are less likely to participate
in premarital sex. A girl who says religion is
very important is much less likely to have premarital sex than one who does not think so.
In 1994, only 38 percent of 15-to-19 year old
teenage girls who said religion was “very important” to them had premarital sex versus the
60 percent who said that religion was “fairly
unimportant”—see Table 8.
Now suppose that the church can influence
the disutility that parents will experience if
their daughters become pregnant. Recall that
reflects the disutility that parents place on a
daughter having an out-of-wedlock birth. Let
(20)

D

r

=
1=

; 0<

< 1;

where r is the amount of religious indoctrination that the church undertakes. Thus, the parents will incur a higher level of disutility the
bigger is the amount of religious indoctrination. Indoctrination is costly and undertaken
according to the cost function
r :
The church wants to minimize the number
of out-of-wedlock births, while taking into account the cost of religious indoctrination. The
number of out-of-wedlock births can be calcu-

lated using (18), (19), and (20) to be
/.An Ao /

/ [1 .1

.1

r

/1C2 ]:

.1

Suppose that the church’s objective is to minimize the sum of out-of-wedlock births and the
cost of religious indoctrination. The church’s
minimization problem will appear as
min .1
r

1

.1

/
/ An

Ao

r

/1C2

.1

Cr ;
which has the solution
rD

.1

/2C2

1=.1

/

:

LEMMA 7: (Socialization by the church)
The amount of religious indoctrination, r , is
increasing in the failure rate for contraception, 1
, and is decreasing in cost of religious education, .
S OCIAL C HANGE
It is now easy to deduce that as contraception becomes more effective, there will be
less socialization by parents, the church and
the state against the perils of premarital sex.
This reduction happens because as the odds
of a sexually active unmarried teenage girl
becoming pregnant drop, there is less need
for socialization and socialization is a costly
process. When the failure rate, 1
, falls,
so does the amount of religious indoctrination, r , by Lemma 7. Parents will care less
if their teenage daughters become pregnant,
since will now be smaller. Thus, by Lemma
6 parents too will engage in less socialization.
Therefore, s will drop. All of this causes a
rise in premarital sex, according to Lemma 5.
A sociologist would observe a simultaneous
rise in premarital sex and a decrease in proscription against it. He may then interpret this
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as social change causing the rise in premarital
sex.
PROPOSITION 6: (Social change) A drop
in the failure rate for contraception, 1
,
will cause a rise in premarital sex, p, and a
drop in parental, s, and religious, r , proscription against it.
D ISCUSSION
Parents want the best for their children.
They spend a great deal of time and effort
educating their kids. Children must learn
many things in order to function effectively
as adults. Not all of the lessons taught by
parents are of a formal nature. Parents may
tell their children to study and/or work hard,
not drink excessively or do drugs, be wise
with their money, and not be dishonest, etc.
Becker (1993) started the modern analysis of
how a child’s preferences can be molded by
parental investments. He explored how parents may predispose children’s preferences toward providing them with old age support.
Becker and Mulligan (1997) analyze how parents can manipulate a child’s rate of time preference. This idea is extended in Doepke and
Zilibotti (2008), who study the decline of the
aristocracy that accompanied the British Industrial Revolution. They argue that parents
who thought their children might enter the
class of skilled workers instilled in their offspring a patience that allowed the children to
sacrifice today to acquire the human capital
necessary so that they would earn more tomorrow. Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) study
the effects of parenting styles. They show
that a lower level of household inequality results in more permissive parenting because the
stakes are lower, a prediction supported by the
empirical evidence. The model of premarital
sex developed here is a simplified version of
Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner
(2014). It has obvious similarities with the
above work, but extends the notion to show
how other players in society, such as churches
or governments, may also try to shape preferences. Their work illustrates how shifts in the
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economic environment can lead to changes in
culture.
A different perspective on preference formation is taken in the well-known work of
Bisin and Verdier (2001). They assume that
parents want their children to behave like
them. The cultural transmission of corruption
is modelled by Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002)
using a variant of the Bisin and Verdier (2001)
framework. They assume that an honest person will suffer by behaving dishonestly. Honest parents educate their children, at a cost,
with the hope that the latter will inherit (in a
probabilistic manner) this notion of guilt associated with dishonest behavior. This is similar
to the concept of shame analyzed here.
6.

Fertility

The birth of a child radically changes a
family. It obviously increases its size, but
it also changes its age and sex composition.
The birth of a child is also costly. It requires resources such as time and goods, often for many years. Finally, birth rates have
first-order effects on population growth and on
the age structure of a population. For all these
reasons, economists have developed models to
better understand the determinants and effects
of fertility decisions.4
The Demographic Transition—A “demographic transition” was experienced by countries throughout the world, starting in Europe
and North America around 1800. The transition was from the high mortality and fertility
rates that characterized the pre-industrial era
toward the low mortality and fertility rates of
the modern era. This can be seen in Figure
15, which plots crude birth rates for four regions of the world. Besides the crude birth
rate, which measures contemporaneous fertility, lifetime fertility also plummeted in countries experiencing a demographic transition.
In the United States, for example, the total fertility rate (the average births over a woman’s
4 There exist a variety of ways to measure fertility, which
are reviewed in Appendix A.A10.
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The Income-Fertility Correlation—There is
a negative cross-sectional correlation between
fertility and income. Figure 16 shows this relationship for various cohorts in the United
States. The negative correlation between fertility and income not only holds in cross
sections of individuals but also across countries, as documented by Manuelli and Seshadri
(2009). In the case of the U.S. economy, Jones
and Tertilt (2008) compute an overall elasticity of children ever born to income of 0:38
across various cohorts. They also document
that although this correlation varies from one
cohort to another, it remains significantly negative between 0:45 (for the 1888 cohort) and
0:16 (for the 1933 cohort).
The Baby Boom—Many developed countries experienced a baby boom about the middle of the 20th century. This baby boom is

most clearly seen in the North America panel
of Figure 15 and spans the years 1936 to 1965.
In the United States, the number of children
ever born went from 2.3 for women born in
1907 (whose average child was born in 1934)
to 3.1 for women born in 1932 (whose average child was born in 1959).5 But the baby
boom was not just in the United States. Australia, New-Zealand, Canada, France, Norway
and Sweden, to cite only a few, also experienced baby booms.
Fertility and Social Upheaval—Periods of
wars, civil wars, revolutions, bouts of occupation by foreign invaders, etc, typically lead
to lower fertility, as documented by Caldwell
(2004). In Spain, for instance, births declined
during the civil war years (1935-1942) just as
much as during the preceding 35 years. In Europe, World War I was associated with a very
large decline in fertility, about 50 percent below trend—see Figure 15. The missing births
during the war were at least as large as, and
sometimes larger than, the military casualties
on the battlefield. The dent in the age composition of European demography caused by
5 See Hernandez (1993, Table 2.2, p. 24).
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World War I was felt long after the war and
throughout the 20th century.
1.

A Model of Fertility

A model is now presented to describe some
of the key trade-offs associated with fertility
choices, as emphasized in the literature. The
economy is populated by households formed
by two adults, a husband and a wife. Assume
that the husband and wife are of the same age
and live for two periods. They both have one
unit of time per period. Each period, the husband spends all of his time working in the market at the wage wm . The wife has two potential uses of her time: working and spending
time taking care of children. Denote the productivity of the wife when she works by w f .
Productivity, w f ; can be interpreted either as
a market wage or as productivity in home production.
The preferences of the household are represented by the utility function
(21)

U.c; k; q/ C U.c0 ; k 0 ; q/:

In this specification,
2 .0; 1/ is the subjective discount factor. The function U is a
utility index with standard properties. The
variables c and c0 represent household consumption in the first and second periods, respectively. Similarly, the variables k and k 0
represent the number of kids in the household during these periods. Assume that k 0
may differ from k because some children may
die between the first and second periods. Let
s 2 .0; 1/ represent the fraction of children
that are still present in the household during
the second period
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C.k; qI w f / measure the period cost of raising
k children with quality q when the wife’s opportunity cost of time is w f . Depending on its
specific form, this function regulates the cost
of children in goods and/or time. The function C is a description of the technology linking inputs, goods and/or time, to the number
of children produced. The budget constraint
of the household is
(23)
cC

C sk; qI w 0f
c0
C C k; qI w f C
r
r
0 C w0
wm
f
D wm C w f C
;
r

where r is the gross rate of interest.6 The
household’s optimization problem is to choose
consumption, c and c0 , the number of children,
k, and their quality, q, to maximize (21) subject to (23). At an optimum, the following
first-order condition must be satisfied for k:
(24) U2 .c; k; q/ C sU2 .c0 ; sk; q/ D
U1 .c; k; q/ C1 .k; qI w f /
C

sC1 .sk; qI w 0f /
r

:

k 0 D sk:

The marginal (lifetime) utility of children is
on the left-hand side of this equation; that is,
the increase in lifetime utility resulting from
an additional birth. The right-hand side shows
the marginal (lifetime) cost of children. The
term in brackets is the marginal goods cost of
children; that is, the increase in the present
value of costs resulting from an additional
birth. This is multiplied by the marginal util-

The variable k (as opposed to k 0 ) measures fertility. The variable q represents the average
quality of children.
Children are costly; recall Table 2, which
shows their monetary cost and Table 6 which
shows their time cost. Let the function

6 Even though the term w appears on the right-hand
f
side of the budget constraint, the disposable income of the
household in the first period is not wm C w f : The function C n; qI w f represents the purchase of all the inputs
needed to raise children, including potentially the wife’s time
at price w f .

(22)
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ity of current consumption, so as to convert
the cost into utils.
A second optimality condition must be satisfied for q:

(27)

(25) U3 .c; k; q/ C U3 .c0 ; sk; q/ D

C

r

:

The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of
increasing children’s quality while the righthand side is the marginal cost. Finally, an
Euler equation must hold to equalize the marginal cost and marginal benefit of savings:
(26)

U1 .c; k; q/ D r U1 c0 ; sk; q :

In what follows, simplified versions of this
generic model are studied to analyze how productivity, mortality and changes in the cost
and/or demand for children quality affect fertility.
2.

V1 .k/ C

sV1 .sk/ D

U1 .c/ e 1 C

U1 .c; k; q/ C2 .k; qI w f /
C2 .sk; qI w 0f /

0 D gw .
rate g > 1: w 0f D gw f and wm
m
The first-order condition for fertility, equation
(24), now reads

s
r

C wf 1 C

gs
r

:

Observe that the left-hand side of equation
(27), which represents the marginal benefit of
children, is decreasing in k while the righthand side, or the marginal cost, is increasing.
The solution of this equation is depicted in
Figure 17.7
Technology affects the household’s decisions via the following channels. First, it can
change the productivity of the husband and/or
that of the wife, that is wm and/or w f : Second, it can affect the resources needed to produce children, that is e and/or . Accordingly,
the effects of changes in technology are now
developed in four propositions.

The Effects of Technology

Consider the following form for the utility
function
U .c; k; q/ D U .c/ C V .k/ :
This version of the model abstracts from child
quality to simplify the discussion. A child
may require units of the wife’s time and/or
e units of goods. The cost function is then
C k; qI w f D e C w f k:

F IGURE 17. T HE D ETERMINATION OF F ERTILITY

Different cases can be represented using this
formulation. There is a general case where a
child requires time and goods, that is > 0
and e > 0. There are also two special cases.
One case is when a child requires only time,
that is > 0 and e D 0, and another case is
when a child requires only goods, that is D 0
and e > 0: Wages grow at the common (gross)

PROPOSITION 7: (Husband’s
earnings
and fertility) Fertility, k, is increasing in the
productivity of the husband, wm .
7 In Figures 17 and 18 the quantity displayed on the vertical axis is marginal utility.

FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE

To understand Proposition 7, contemplate
equation (27). It reveals that an increase in
wm ; the productivity of the husband, reduces
the marginal cost of children and therefore,
raises fertility. To understand why, hold fertility, k, constant at any arbitrary level. An
increase in wm unambiguously raises consumption and, thus, reduces its marginal utility. This implies that the cost of diverting
resources away from consumption and into
more kids is reduced. Thus, the right-hand
side of equation (27) decreases, as represented
in Figure 18, implying an increase in the optimal fertility choice. This is an income effect.
REMARK 1: (Fertility and wars) Proposition 7 can be used to deduce the effect of a
war on fertility. Recall that wars are associated with large decreases in fertility rates.
This is because male-specific wartime mortality is akin to a decrease in expected household income. That is, when making its fertility
choice, the household takes into account that
the woman may have to raise the children on
just her own income, if her husband becomes
a casualty of war. This implies a decrease in
fertility via the income effect. Death benefits
and the possibility of remarriage would mitigate this effect.
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PROPOSITION 8: (Wife’s earnings and
fertility)
A - Children cost goods ( D 0; e > 0)—
Fertility, k, is increasing in the productivity of
the wife, w f .
B - Children cost time ( > 0; e D 0)—An
increase in w f causes fertility, k, to
(i) decrease if U1 .c/ c is nondecreasing;
(ii) either increase or decrease if U1 .c/ c is
decreasing.
Part A of Proposition 8 can be explained
with the same argument as for Proposition 7.
When a child requires no time, an increase in
the wife’s productivity acts as an income effect. It raises consumption and, therefore, decreases the marginal cost of a child.
Part B of Proposition 8 deals with the case
where an increase in the wife’s productivity
implies both an income and a substitution effect. These effects may act in the same or
opposite directions, depending upon the shape
of preferences. To see this, it pays to rewrite
equation (27) as
(28)

"

V1 .k/ C
1

1C

wf
wm

sV1 .sk/
!
1
gCr
gs C r

k

#

D U1 .c/ c C U1 c0 c0 :

F IGURE 18. T HE E FFECT OF A D ECREASE IN THE
M ARGINAL C OST OF C HILDREN ON F ERTILITY

(See Appendix A.A5 for a derivation of this
equation.) First, when w f increases, there
is an increase in the opportunity cost of the
wife’s time. This is represented by a decrease
of the left-hand side of equation (28) for each
value of k. Second, an increase in w f raises
consumption. This reduces the marginal cost
of a child since U1 .c/ drops, and hence, so
does the cost of taking resources away from
consumpton. To understand what will happen
to the left-hand side of equation (28) for each
value of k, consider the case of logarithmic
utility, U .c/ D ln .c/. The term U1 .c/ c is
constant and so will be the right-hand side of
equation (28). In this case, fertility decreases
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from k to k , as represented in Figure 19. If
the utility index U is such that U1 .c/ c is increasing, the right-hand side of equation (28)
rises and fertility further decreases to k
as
represented in Figure 19. Therefore, when
U1 .c/ c is nondecreasing, fertility falls as w f
increases, as stated in Part B(i) of Proposition
8. When U1 .c/ c is decreasing, however, the
reduction in the marginal utility of consumption may be strong enough to offset a part, or
all, of the rising opportunity cost of time for
the wife. In this case (which is not represented
in Figure 19) the final value of fertility would
be greater than k . Its position relative to
the initial fertility, k , is ambiguous, however,
without additional restrictions on the shape of
preferences.

F IGURE 19. T HE E FFECT
TIVITY ON F ERTILITY

OF

W OMEN ’ S P RODUC -

The result in Proposition 8 deserves a few
additional remarks. First, the shape of the
utility index V is immaterial to the conclusion. Note, however, that it is relevant for
the magnitude of the effect of productivity on
fertility. Second, the term U1 .c/ c is informative because it measures the pace at which
the marginal utility of consumption, which
is a component of the cost of children, decreases relative to the rise in consumption induced by productivity increases. A decreasing U1 .c/ c means that the marginal utility
of consumption decreases “fast” as consumption increases, implying the marginal cost of a
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child may eventually decrease. An increasing
U1 .c/ c has the opposite interpretation.
REMARK 2: (Gender earnings gap and
fertility) Proposition 8 can be used to deduce the effect of changes in the ratio w f =wm ,
which in the context of this model measures the gender gap in earnings. Specifically, Proposition 8 is equivalent to studying
changes in the gender gap, w f =wm , holding
wm fixed.
PROPOSITION 9: (Earnings and fertility)
A - Children cost goods ( D 0; e > 0)—A
proportional increase in wm and w f causes
fertility, k, to increase.
B - Children cost time ( > 0; e D 0)—A proportional increase in wm and w f causes fertility, k, to
(i) remain constant if U1 .c/ c is constant (income and substitution effects cancel out);
(ii) increase if U1 .c/ c is decreasing (dominating income effect);
(iii) decrease if U1 .c/ c is increasing (dominating substitution effect).
Proposition 9 describes the effect of proportional growth in wm and w f : Think, for example, of two generations: the first one faces low
values for wm and w f while the second one
faces high values because wm and w f grow.
Note that the two generations face the same
growth rate, g. Part A of Proposition 9 follows
from an inspection of equation (27): a proportional increase in wm and w f raises consumption, which unambiguously reduces the marginal cost of a child when D 0: Part B of the
Proposition deals with the case when there is a
time cost for children. In this case there is both
an income and a substitution effect. Consider
equation (28) again. A proportional change
in wm and w f leaves its left-hand side unchanged. Thus, the result depends only upon
the property of the right-hand side of the equation as consumption rises. Three cases are discussed and illustrated by Figure 20. In the
case of a logarithmic utility index U , the term
U1 .c/ c is constant. Fertility remains constant at k when both wm and w f increase
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proportionately. This is the well-known case
where the income and substitution effects cancel each others out. If U1 .c/ c is increasing,
the substitution effect dominates and fertility
decreases. If U1 .c/ c is decreasing, the opposite result prevails.

F IGURE 20. T HE E FFECT OF A P ROPORTIONAL
I NCREASE IN THE P RODUCTIVITY OF M EN AND
W OMEN ON F ERTILITY

PROPOSITION 10: (Household technology
and fertility) A decrease in the time cost of
raising a child, , and/or in the good cost, e,
increases fertility.
The result in Proposition 10 derives directly
from an inspection of equation (27) since a decrease in and/or e leads to a decrease in the
marginal cost of raising a child. The effect
of such change is represented, graphically, in
Figure 18.
3.

The Effect of Infant and Child Mortality

To discuss the effects of a change in child
mortality, that is, a change in the survival parameter, s, return to equation (27). Note that the
survival probability s affects both the left- and
the right-hand sides of the equation. On the
right-hand side of equation (27), an increase
in s raises the expected cost of children. On
the left-hand side, the marginal (lifetime) utility of children depends upon the survival probability via two channels. Focus on the term
sV1 .sk/. Again, hold k fixed at any arbitrary
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level. On the one hand, an increase in s raises
the marginal (lifetime) utility of children because it raises the expected flow of utils derived from children. On the other hand, an
increase in s implies that more children are
present in the household in the second period. This reduces the (period) marginal utility, V1 .sk/, and, therefore, reduces the marginal lifetime utility of children. Which effect
dominates depends upon the specific functional form chosen for V .
The following proposition gives a condition
under which the effect of s on the number of
children born, and the number of surviving
children, is unambiguous.
PROPOSITION 11: (Effect of child mortality) When sV1 .sk/ is nonincreasing in s, an
increase in the survival probability, s, reduces
fertility, k, so that dk=ds < 0, and raises
the number of surviving children, implying
d.sk/=ds > 0.
The proof of this result is given in Appendix A.A6. The condition that sV1 .sk/
is nonincreasing in s implies that V1 .sk/ C
skV11 .sk/ 0. It is therefore a condition on
the curvature of the utility function V . Under
this condition, the effect of an increase in s
can be represented, graphically, by an upward
shift of the increasing (marginal cost) curve
in Figure 17, and a downward shift of the decreasing (marginal benefit) curve. Note that in
the case of logarithmic utility, V .k/ D ln .k/,
the function sV1 .sk/ is a constant. The two
effects of s on the marginal utility of a child
exactly offset each other. In this case the sole
effect of an increase in s is to raise the marginal cost of a child. Proposition 11 also states
that the number of surviving children, sk, increases with the survival rate, s. That is, when
the survival rate, s, increases by 1 percent, fertility, k, decreases by less than 1 percent. As
a result the number of surviving children, sk,
increases.
When sV1 .sk/ is increasing in s, the marginal (lifetime) utility of children is increasing
in their survival. Graphically, the effect of an
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increase in s would be represented by upward
shifts of both curves in Figure 17, so the effect
on k is ambiguous without further specifying
functional forms and parameters. Examples 1
and 2 below use common forms for the utility
function that are found in the literature.

The first-order conditions for fertility, k, and
expenditures, e; are

EXAMPLE 1: (CRRA preferences for fertility) Let V .k/ D k 1 = .1
1.
/ with
Then sV1 .sk/ D s 1 k
is nonincreasing
in s: An increase in s reduces fertility and increases the number of surviving children.

(32)

EXAMPLE 2: (Logarithmic
preferences
for fertility with a minimum number of
children) Let V .k/ D ln .k k/ where k > 0
is a minimum requirement for the number
of children. Then sV1 .sk/ D 1= .k k=s/
is decreasing in s. An increase in s reduces
fertility and increases the number of surviving
children.
4.

Quality and Human Capital
T HE Q UALITY-Q UANTITY T RADEOFF

To simplify the discussion, consider a static
version of the model; that is, let D 0. Preferences are represented by the utility function
(29)

U .c/ C V .k/ C H .q/ :

To specify the cost function suppose that a
child requires
units of time and that he
can be endowed with quality q through goods
spending, e: Specifically, imagine that there is
a production function
q D Q .e/ ;
describing the relationship between expenditure per child and the quality of children. Assume that the household has a total of one unit
of time and that the market wage is w. That
is, for simplicity, abstract from the distinction
between husband and wife. The budget constraint now reads
(30)

c C k .e C w/ D w:

(31)

V1 .k/ D U1 .c/ .e C w/ ;

and
J1 .e/ D U1 .c/ k:

where J .e/ H .Q .e//. The right-hand side
of equation (31) is the marginal cost of a child.
It depends upon the marginal utility of consumption, U1 .c/, as well as on the wage rate,
w, and the level of expenditures on quality, e.
This is because (i) the higher the marginal utility of consumption, the more costly it is to use
resources for childrearing instead of consumption; (ii) the higher the wage rate, the higher
the opportunity cost of time spent with a child;
and (iii) the higher the expenditures per child,
the more costly the marginal child. The righthand side of equation (32) is the marginal cost
of goods spending on quality. Imagine increasing expenditure on child quality by one
unit. This will cost k units of consumption because the household has k kids. To convert
this into cost in utility terms, multiply this by
the marginal utility of consumption, to capture the loss from cutting consumption by k
units. Note that the marginal cost of investing
in child quality is increasing in the number of
children.
To discuss the effect of productivity on fertility, it is useful to define the elasticity of substitution between fertility and consumption,
ck , and between fertility and expenditures on
quality, ek :
ck

and

d ln .c=k/
;
d ln .V1 .k/ =U1 .c//

d ln .e=k/
;
d ln .V1 .k/ =J1 .e//
where ck ; ek > 0. The elasticity ck shows
how the c=k ratio changes along an indifference curve as the relative price of consumpek
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where 1 > 0 is defined in Appendix A.A8.
tion and fertility changes. The latter, at an optimum, is equal to the marginal rate of substiThe proof of this result is given in Appendix
tution; hence, the term d ln .V1 .k/ =U1 .c// in
A.A8.
the denominator for ck . Similarly, the elasticity ek shows how the e=k ratio changesC ASE 1: ek D ck D 1. It follows from equaalong an indifference curve as the relative
tion (33) that d ln .k/ =d ln .w/ D 0; i.e.,
price of expenditures and fertility changes.
fertility remains constant when producNote, here, that the marginal rate of subtivity increases. This is the well-known
stitution between expenditures and fertility,
case where income and substitution efV1 .k/ =J1 .e/, depends on the function J ,
fects cancel out. Specifically, an increase
which reflects a composition of the utility and
in productivity makes the time spent takproduction functions for child quality. As the
ing care of a child relatively more expenprice of, say, fertility relative to consumption
sive. This is a force toward a reduction in
rises—that is, as the marginal rate of substitufertility. But, there is also an income eftion V1 .k/ =U1 .c/ rises—the optimal c=k rafect: the household can afford more chiltio rises in a proportion given by ck . A high
dren. This is a force toward an increase
elasticity of substitution means, therefore, a
in fertility. In the case at hand, these
high willingness to substitute away from the
two effects exactly offset each other. It
relatively more expensive commodity. Thus,
is obvious from equation (34) that e=w
these elasticities control how the household
remains constant. This implies that exwill adjust its spending on c, k, and e as
penditure per child, e, rises in lockstep
wages, w, change. These elasticites play an
with wages.
important role in the proposition below. ApC ASE 2: ek > 1 and ck D 1. Equation (33) impendix A.A7 derives their exact formulas.
plies d ln .k/ =d ln .w/ < 0; i.e., fertility
decreases when productivity increases.
Here, fertility declines because it is more
PROPOSITION 12: (Productivity and the
substitutable with expenditures than in
quality-quantity tradeoff) The effect of proCase 1. Equation (34) reveals that e=w
ductivity, w, on fertility, k, and expenditure on
rises. Thus, expenditure per child, e,
child quality (in intensive form), e=w, is demoves up at a faster clip than wages, w.
scribed by
Thus, due to the high degree of substid ln .k/
tutability between k and e, the house(33)
D
hold reduces the quantity of children in
d ln .w/
favor of higher quality per child, as pro1
c
1
1
ek
1
ductivity rises and expenditures on qual1 w c
w c
ck
ek
ity become relatively cheaper. [Equation
ek
1
1
c
1
(A16) in Appendix A.A8 establishes that
C
1
C
;
c=w remains constant.]
1 w c
w c
ek
ck
C ASE 3:

and
(34)
d ln .e=w/
D
d ln .w/

1

1

1=

ck

.1=

ek

1C

1/
1
;
1 c=w

Equaek D 1 and
ck > 1.
tion (33) implies d ln .k/ =d ln .w/ < 0;
i.e., fertility decreases when productivity increases. In this case, the fertility decline occurs for a different reason than in the previous case: fertility declines because it is more substitutable with consumption than in Case
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1. The household substitutes the quantity
of children for more consumption as productivity rises and expenditures on consumption become relatively cheaper. As
can be seen from equation (34), e=w remains constant. Therefore, it is obvious
from the budget constraint that c=w must
move up with productivity—the doubter
can check equation (A16) in Appendix
A.A8. So, the high substitutability of
the quantity of children with consumption induces the household to increase its
spending on consumption at a faster rate
than the increase in productivity, while
maintaining the budget share of quality
spending constant.
So, there are at least two distinct mechanisms through which increases in productivity
lead to decreases in fertility: the substitution
of fertility for quality as in Case 2, or the substitution for consumption as in Case 3. Note
that the two mechanisms are not observationally equivalent. The behavior of c=w and e=w
can help one tell, using data, which case is at
hand.
It is important to note that ek , the elasticity
of substitution between the quantity of children and their average quality, depends upon
the properties of the function J .e/ (see Appendix A.A7), which is identical to H .Q .e//.
This function combines, therefore, characteristics of preferences, via H , as well as technology, via Q. The examples below use some
common forms for tastes and technology that
are found in the literature.
EXAMPLE 3: (CRRA preferences for
consumption,
logarithmic preferences
over quantity and quality, and an
isoelastic production technology) Let
U .c/ D c1 =.1
/, with 0 <
< 1,
V .k/ D ln k, H .q/ D ln q, and
1
Q .e/ D
Then, ck > 1 and
0e .
D
1—see
the
elasticity formulas in
ek
Appendix A.A7. It is immediate that Case 3
will transpire. Fertility will fall with wages
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while expenditure per child will increase in
proportion with them.
EXAMPLE 4: (Logarithmic
preferences
for consumption and quantity, CRRA
preferences over quality, and an isoelastic
production technology) Let U .c/ D ln c,
V .k/ D ln k, H .q/ D q 1 =.1
/, with
0 <
< 1, and Q .e/ D 0 e 1 . Then,
ck D 1 and ek > 1—see Appendix A.A7.
Here Case 2 will obtain. Again, fertility will
fall with wages, while expenditure per child
will increase faster than them.
H UMAN CAPITAL ( AS CHILD QUALITY )
In the previous setup parents derive utility from the quality of their children. It is
straightforward to turn this into a model where
they care about their offspring’s earnings. To
achieve this, interpret Q .e/ as human capital that can be rented on the labor market in
exchange for a wage. Suppose that children
leave their parents’ home and become adults
after one period. Let the parents’ preferences
be represented by a slightly modified version
of equation (29):
U .c/ C V .k/ C H .gw Q .e// :
The term gw Q .e/ represents the future earnings of a child supplying human capital,
Q .e/ ; at the wage rate per efficiency unit of
labor prevailing next period, gw. The human capital of each parent is normalized to 1.
Thus, in this setup, parents’ preferences are
defined over the future earnings of their children, which they can influence via investment
in education. The budget constraint and firstorder condition for k are as described by equations (30) and (31), respectively. The firstorder condition for e now reads
(35)

H1 .gw Q .e// gw Q 1 .e/ D U1 .c/ k:

A difference between the quality-quantity
model of the previous section and the human
capital model can be seen by comparing the
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first-order conditions (32) and (35). In equation (32) a change in the wage, w, affects the
optimal decision because it changes the marginal cost of expenditures on quality, on the
right-hand side, via a change in the marginal
utility of consumption. This effect is also
present in the human capital model. But, there
is another effect: a change in productivity also
changes the marginal benefit of expenditures,
on the left-hand side of equation (35), because
it changes the future earnings of a child.
Note that the growth rate of productivity,
g, also matters for the determination of fertility. This is another difference with the quality
model of the previous section. A change in
the growth rate of productivity has two opposing effects. On the one hand, an increase in
g lowers the marginal benefit of a child’s future earnings because, all else equal, it raises
these earnings. This is represented by the term
H1 .gw Q .e// on the left-hand side of equation (35). On the other hand, an increase in
g raises the marginal benefit of investing in
the quality of the child since each unit of human capital gets paid at a higher price. This
is represented by the term gw Q 1 .e/ on the
left-hand side of equation (35). Which one
of these two effects dominates depends on the
shape of preferences. The following result is
established in Appendix A.A9.
PROPOSITION 13: (The effect of productivity growth on fertility and human capital)
Assume that U .c/ D ln .c/ ; V .k/ D ln .k/,
and H .q/ D q 1 = .1
/, with > 0. An
increase in the growth rate of productivity, g,
causes fertility, k, to
(i) decrease if 2 .0; 1/;
(ii) remain constant if D 1;
(iii) increase if > 1.
Human capital, Q .e/, moves oppositely with
fertility, k.
5.

Discussion

The modern approach to fertility in macroeconomics stems from the work of Razin and
Ben-Zion (1975) and Barro and Becker (1988,
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1989). These authors are among the first to
model fertility decisions in versions of the optimal growth model, which has proven useful
in the analysis of growth-related phenomena.
Economists have argued that the demographic transition may be, among other things,
a response of fertility to rising income and/or
productivity. Galor and Weil (1996), for
instance, propose a model where the accumulation of physical capital leads to an increase in women’s relative wages because capital is more complementary to women’s input
than to men’s. This increase in the relative
wages of women raises the cost of childbearing and, thus, leads to a reduction in fertility. In the language of the model developed
above, the mechanism proposed by Galor and
Weil (1996) works as described in Proposition 8B(i). Galor and Weil (2000) present a
theory of the long-run relationship between
population growth, technology, and economic
growth. In their theoretical model an economy
can stagnate, then enter a regime where both
population growth and technological progress
increase, and, finally, experience a demographic transition jointly with sustained economic growth. Galor (2012) presents a similar, simplified model. Galor (2005, 2011)
presents a unified view of the transition from
stagnation to growth that, in the data, coincided with the demographic transition.
Galor (2005, 2011) also insists on the importance of human capital and education to
understand the demographic transition. A key
aspect of his analysis is that the production
of human capital depends on expenditures as
well as on the future growth rate of productivity. In Section 6.4 this was modeled by
letting the quality of a child be measured directly by his future earnings: gw Q .e/. As
shown in Proposition 13, this mechanism can
lead to the to fewer children being born, but
now they are of higher quality. On the qualityquantity tradeoff, Cavalcanti, Kocharkov, and
Santos (2016) observe that the total fertility
rate in Kenya for 2008 was 4.6. Out of this,
unwanted children corresponded to 1.2 kids.
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They analysis the impact of lowering the cost
of contraception (including abortion). They
find that this can lead to a significant increase
in per capita GDP, because it results in fewer
children of higher quality.
In Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and
Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke
(2005), the driving force behind the secular
decline in fertility is rising productivity. Both
of the models are fit to very long-run U.S. fertility data. In the former, an education decision is modeled so that the analysis is consistent with the rise in education and the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry. In
the latter, the rise in productivity generates an
increase in the opportunity cost of raising children, following the logic explained in Proposition 9 of Section 6.2.
The decline in infant and child mortality
has also been discussed as a potential factor
explaining the demographic transition. Many
authors have adopted versions of the perfect
foresight model presented in here, where there
is no uncertainty over the number of surviving
children. Eckstein, Mira and Wolpin (1999) is
an example. They posit a period utility function for children of the form presented in Example 2, that is V .k/ D ln .k k/, where
k > 0 acts as a minimum number of children
needed in the household. They estimate their
model using Swedish times series data, and
find that the reduction in infant and child mortality rates is the most important factor driving
the fertility decline. Productivity also reduced
fertility, but the reduction in adult mortality
had no effect by itself. Reductions in infant
and child mortality rates, alone, cannot explain the decline in the number of surviving
children, as shown by Propostion 11.
Bar and Leukhina (2010) propose a model
of the transition from stagnation to growth,
along the lines of Barro and Becker (1989)
and Hansen and Prescott (2002). The mechanism through which infant and child mortality reduces fertility, in their model, is similar to that described in Proposition 11. Bar
and Leukhina (2010) use their model to as-
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sess the contribution of productivity growth
versus that of declining mortality in explaining the time series of fertility in England between 1650 and 1950. They find that changes
in young-age mortality account for close to 60
percent of the decline in fertility.
Boldrin and Jones (2002) present a version
of the Barro and Becker model where children
care about their parents’ old-age consumption. In this model fertility is an investment
into future consumption and a decrease in infant mortality reduces fertility. Doepke (2005)
also presents versions of the Barro and Becker
model to analyze the effect of infant and child
mortality. He distinguishes two classes of
models, one where there is no uncertainty over
the number of surviving children and another
where there is. In the model developed in this
section, there is no uncertainty. Theoretical results for models with uncertainty on the number of surviving children are also presented in
Sah (1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2003). In a
quantitative exercise Doepke (2005) finds that
calibrated versions of his models yield similar implications: they all predict a decline in
fertility rates as infant mortality declines, but
none predicts a decline in the number of surviving children as seen in the data. These are
the results of Proposition 11.
Besides technological progress, the demand
for human capital and mortality, other factors have been contemplated in the economic
literature discussing the demographic transition. Doepke (2004) analyzes differences in
the timing and pace of the demographic transition across countries (see Figure 15), and
ascribes them to differences in child labor
laws. Boldrin, de Nardi and Jones (2015)
argue that government-provided old-age pensions are strongly associated with a low fertility.
Barro and Becker (1988) ascribe the baby
boom to a catch-up effect associated with low
fertility during World War II. Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005) present a
list of arguments to dispute the notion that the
baby boom was a response to World War II.
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They propose a theory where the main impetus for the baby boom comes from improvements in household productivity that made it
possible for women to spend less time raising children. They argue that such improvements were made available by the diffusion of
electricity and associated appliances, the introduction of new goods such as frozen foods,
the growing availability of running water and
gas heaters, etc., as well as the rationalization of the home following scientific management principles discovered on factory floors.
In the framework of the model presented here,
their theory can be viewed as technological
advance causing a decrease in , the time cost
of raising a child. Suppose, as they do, that
U1 .c/ c is increasing. Then, in the long run,
proportional increases to wm and w f lead to
a downward trend in fertility. When a new
technology is introduced to save time in the
household in the form of a lower , the righthand side of equation (28) increases, leading
to an increase in fertility—see Proposition 10
above. As time passes, the continued growth
of productivity eventually takes over, and fertility resumes its declining trend: the baby
boom is over.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2014) also propose
an explanation of the baby boom based on
technological improvements. They document
that there has been a remarkable decline in
maternal mortality during the Twentieth Century: in 1900 the maternal mortality rate was
above 80 deaths (per 10,000 live births), while
it was below 10 by 1950. Thus, most of the
gain occurred during the first half of the century, namely, during the 1930s. They conduct
an empirical analysis to assess the effect of
maternal mortality on fertility. They find that a
decline in maternal mortality of 10 deaths (per
10,000 live births) yields an increase in completed fertility of 0.27 children per married
woman. One can again associate improvements in medical technology with a decline in
, in the context of the model presented here.
The idea behind this association is that may
be composed of both the time spent recover-

50

ing from the delivery of the child and the time
spent taking care of the child. Improvements
in medical technology reduce the time spent
recovering from the delivery and therefore reduce the cost of a child.
Another attempt at explaining the baby
boom using modern macroeconomic tools is
by Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015). Their
theory links the baby boom to the job market conditions faced by young women immediately after the World War II. These conditions were worse than usual. This was because
older women, who started to work during
the war and gained experience, retained these
jobs after the war. This increased labor-force
participation of older women lowered market wages for women relative to men and induced younger women to stay home and raise
children. Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015)
present evidence of the decline in the relative wage of women and the increased laborforce participation of older women after the
war. They build an equilibrium model of fertility and labor-force participation, which they
calibrate to U.S. data. In their main experiment, they find that their model accounts for
80 percent of the increase in fertility during
the baby boom, as a consequence of World
War II, which they model as a shock to government spending, and male and female laborforce participation. In the framework of the
model presented here, equation (28) shows
that a decline in w f =wm raises fertility. This,
in a nutshell, summarizes part of the argument
in Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015): The poor
labor-market conditions for women following
World War II lead to an increase in fertility.
Zhao (2014) associates the baby boom with
changes in the marginal tax rate induced by
World War II. Specifically, Zhao (2014) shows
that the marginal income tax rate for an average American increased from 4 to 25 percent
during the war. He proposes a model where
children cost time and where, using the language of the simple model described above,
preferences are such that U1 .c/ c is increasing. Thus, an increase in the marginal tax rate
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reduces the opportunity cost of time and the
marginal cost of a child, as per the result of
Proposition 9. On the basis of a computational
experiment, Zhao (2014) concludes that this
change in tax policy was an important cause
of the baby boom.
Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) document,
and seek to explain, the negative correlation
between fertility and income across countries. They build a model of fertility choice
and investment in both a child’s human and
health capitals. In a quantitative exercise, they
find that differences in productivity across
countries account for a large fraction of
cross-country differences in fertility. Jones,
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2011) review a variety of mechanisms that may generate the negative income-fertility correlation. They emphasize that almost all theories rely on the existence of a time cost of raising a child. In the
language of the model presented here, > 0
is critical. They also emphasize that models
that distinguish between husbands and wives
need to rely on positive assortative matching of spouses for fertility to be declining
in the husband’s income. Positive assortative mating is discussed in Section 3.2. Finally, they consider models with endogenous
investment in child quality. They find that
modeling the choice of a child’s quality does
not, per se, lead to a negative income-fertility
correlation—in line with Proposition 12.
Caldwell (2004) documents how fertility
typically collapses during periods of war and
social unrest. Barro and Becker (1988) argue that the increase in military spending in
the United States during World War II reduced wealth and, therefore, lowered fertility. Similarly, Vandenbroucke (2014) presents
a quantitative analysis where the outbreak of
a war is akin to an expected income shock;
i.e., the expected income of the household decreases when the husband is more likely to
die. To the extent that children are normal
goods, the model then predicts that fertility
should decline during periods of war.
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7.

Quantitative Theory

This section presents a simple example
illustrating how macroeconomic models of
family-related decisions can be used to answer
quantitative questions. The question at hand
regards the baby boom in the United States.
Specifically, how did technological innovation
in the household sector contribute to the baby
boom?
1.

A Structural Model of the Baby Boom

A one-period version of the model presented in Section 6 is laid out. This amounts
to setting D 0 in equation (21). There is
only one adult in each family, so the model
abstracts from differences between men and
women. Preferences are represented by
U.c; k; q/ D

c1
1

C .1

/ k;

implying that there is no quality dimension to
children. The cost of children is specified by
C .k; qI w/ D wk;
so that only the time spent on children matters. There are two technologies available to
help a family raise children. The technologies are differentiated by their time cost, ,
and their price, p. The first technology (old)
has a high time cost, high , while the second
technology (new) has a low cost, low , where
low < high . The new technology has a price
of p D e, while the old one is free so that
p D 0. Thus, technology is represented by the
bundle . ; p/.
The decision problem for a family who has
chosen technology . ; p/ is
V .w; ; p/ D max
c;k

c1
1

C .1

subject to
c C wk D w

p:

/k ;
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The technology adoption decision for a family
is given by

. ; p/ D

8
>
< .
>
: .

high ; 0/–old,
low ; e/–new,

if V .w;
> V .w;
if V .w;
< V .w;

high ; 0/
low ; e/;
high ; 0/
low ; e/:

One might expect that a high-wage family will
be more inclined to adopt the second technology. To address this, in what follows, families
will differentiated by their wage rate, w.
2.

Empirical Estimation

The model will now be matched with the
U.S. data. Depending on the question at
hand, researchers may use cross-sectional
data, time-series data, or a combination of
both. Models can be matched to various types
of stylized facts. These facts may be key
moments in the data, such as means, standard deviations, and correlations. Models may
also be matched with the results of regression
equations, such as the estimated coefficients
on certain variables. The matching may be
done informally (the eyeball metric), or formally using various distance estimators, such
as minimum distance or simulated method of
moments. Often when regression coefficients
are matched in the analysis an indirect inference procedure is incorporated into the estimation.
For the purpose of this illustration, the
model will be matched to data from crosssections of U.S. counties: data at the household level is not available. First, the model
must be readied to generate within- and
across-county heterogeneity. Let ln wi j
N w j ; A denote the distribution of wages
for individual i in county j, and the let w j be
distributed in line with ln w j
N .0; B / :
Second, two periods must be considered. The
first period will correspond to the lowest total fertility rate in the U.S. before the baby
boom, the mid-1930s. The second period will
correspond to the peak of the baby boom, the
late 1950s. To be precise, the total fertil-

ity rate of women born in 1932 (whose average child was born in 1959) was 28 percent higher than that of women born in 1907
(whose average child was born in 1934). This
increase in fertility will be targeted in the empirical estimation. The differences between
the first and second period will be engineered
by assuming that all wages grow by 2 percent
per year and that the cost of the new technology, e, decreases by 2 percent per year.
There are 1959 1934 D 25 years between
the two periods. Assume that low D 0:5
high . The parameters of the model, !
; ; e; high ; A ; B , are estimated via the
following, unweighted, minimum distance estimation:
min M .!/0 M .!/
!

where M .!/ is a 6 1 vector of the differences between the moments implied by the
model and their empirical counterparts. An indirect inference procedure is incorporated into
the estimation. Specifically, the moments used
are the following:
1) The variance of log income across U.S.
counties. This statistic is obtained from
Haines (2004). The earliest year in his
dataset is 1950, and the figure for the
variance of log-income across counties
in that year is 0:17.
2) The variance of log income across U.S.
households. The value 0:35 is obtained
from U.S. Census data for 1940.
3) The fraction of households that had
adopted a modern technology in 1940.
The value of this statistic is 0:35 and is
taken from Bailey and Collins (2011).
This measure is built from Census data
reporting the proportion of housing units
equipped with refrigerators, washing
machines, electric stoves and electric services.
4) The ratio of the total fertility rate of the
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late 1950s to that of the mid 1930s. The
value of this statistic is 1:28:
5) The coefficient from a regression of fertility on adoption and income in the
first period using county-level data. The
value of this statistic is 0:35 and is estimated in Baily and Collins (2011).
6) The coefficient from a regression of the
change in fertility on the change in adoption and the change in income using
county-level data. The value of this statistic is 0:17, and again the source is
Bailey and Collins (2011).
R ESULTS
The estimated parameters are

high

D 0:10; D 0:49; e D 1:60;
D 15:62; A D 0:66; B D 0:51:

The fit to the targeted moments is reported in
Table 9. The model is able to replicate the observed baby boom that took place between the
mid 1930s and the late 1950s. The engine behind the baby boom is technological progress
in the household sector, which implied a drop
in the price of the time-saving technology.
The adoption of the time-saving technology
promotes fertility—recall Proposition 10. The
baby boom occurred despite the fact that at the
same time wages rose, which would have operated to curtail fertility—Proposition 9 B(iii).
KOOPMANS (1947)
At first glance, the above regression coefficients would appear to contradict the result in
Proposition 10, that a fall in the time cost of
raising children will lead to a rise in fertility.
This may lead an empirical researcher to reject the model. Yet, the model mimics these
results almost perfectly. Koopmans (1947)
noted some time ago that care must be exercised when interpreting the coefficients on
nonstructural regression equations. First, the
theory outlined is specified at the level of the
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household, while the regressions are run using
county-level data. Second, adoption, fertility, and income are all endogenous variables.
These factors do not invalidate the use of the
above regression coefficients in the indirect inference exercise. They affect their interpretation, though. Recall that households differ by
their wage rates. High-wage households will
have lower fertility. Now, high-wage household are more likely to adopt the expensive
new technology than are low-wage ones. So,
if high-wage households adopt the new technology first, then a regression of fertility on
adoption, at the county-wide level, may show
that technology adoption is associated with a
drop in fertility; i.e., even though the fertility rate of those who have adopted the new
technology may have risen, their rate will still
be lower than for those who did not adopt the
technology.
3.

Discussion

The model of the baby boom estimated
here is a simplified version of the Greenwood,
Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005) model
that is presented in Greenwood, Seshadri and
Vandenbroucke (2015). For more detail on
the estimation procedure, see the latter paper. This type of estimation procedure is common in modern family economics. For example, Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and
Santos (2016) use minimum distance estimation to match a dynamic stochastic model of
marriage, divorce, educational attainment, and
married female labor-force participation to the
post WW II U.S. data. Eckstein, Keane and
Lifshitz (2016) do a similar exercise using
simulated method of moments.
Bailey and Collins (2011) misconstrue,
for the reasons discussed earlier, the regression coefficients presented above as rejecting
the Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke
(2005) hypothesis. As is shown, their regressions results can easily be appended to an estimation of the Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2015) model by using an indirect
inference procedure; the model is fully capa-
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ble of matching them in addition to other stylized facts. This is an example of how care
must be taken when interpreting nonstructural
regression equations. For an introduction to
simulation-based estimation, in general, and
to indirect inference, in particular, see Renault
(2008) and Smith (2008), respectively.
Example of papers (previously discussed)
in the genre of quantitative theory are numerous. A short and non-exhaustive list covering various topics and quantitative methods is as follows: Benhabib, Rogerson and
Wright (1991) study household production;
Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005)
research married female labor-force participation; Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) investigate the joint decisions of women to work
and bear children; Regalia and Rios-Rull
(2001) examine the rise in the number of
single mothers; Fernandez and Wong (2016)
and Voena (2015) probe the marriage market;
Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner
(2014) explore premarital sex; Eckstein, Mira
and Wolpin (1999) and Greenwood, Seshadri
and Vandenbroucke (2005) analyze fertility.
8.

Conclusions

This review surveys macroeconomic models of married female labor-force participation, marriage and divorce, social change, and
fertility. The modern macroeconomic literature dealing with family-related decisions can
be read through the lenses of these models.
This literature has not answered all questions,
but much progress has been made, thanks to
the use of economic modeling, in explaining
(i) the huge rise in married female labor-force
participation; (ii) the large drop in marriage
and the increase in divorce; (iii) the uptick in
positive assortative mating; (iv) the issue of
children living in poverty with a lone parent;
and (v) baby booms and busts.
An example is provided illustrating how
macroeconomic models of the family can be
matched with stylized facts from the data, using minimum distance estimation. Theories
must be quantified before they can be used for
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any serious policy analysis. The set of moments to be targeted can include facts from
nonstructural regression analysis. So, nonstructural regression may be used as an input
into quantitative theory. Sometimes care must
be taken when interpreting the results from
nonstructural regressions. The connection between economic theory and nonstructural regressions may at times prove to be elusive.
To date, a general equilibrium model of fertility, marriage and divorce, and married female labor-force participation has not been
developed. It seems likely that the secular
decline in fertility is connected with the rise
in married female labor-force participation.
Matching these long-run facts, in addition to
the cross-sectional facts on female labor-force
participation and fertility, would be an important thing to do. The development of such a
macroeconomic model is essential for understanding a host of policy questions surrounding the family.
Some sample policy questions include the
following: First, should child care be subsidized? Such policies may help working
women manage jobs and families. This
is important because disruptions to working
women’s careers, due to child birth, may account for a large portion of the gender wage
gap. Additionally, in a world with declining
fertility, where the ratio of the elderly to the
young population is high, such policies might
be important for publicly financing retirement.
This leads to the second question: Should fertility be promoted? Third, should the tax system be designed to promote marriage? As
was discussed, children growing up in singleparent families appear to do worse in life than
those growing up in two-parent families. So,
in a world where more and more children
are born out of wedlock, promoting marriage
could be important. Additionally, the movement toward more single-parent households is
connected to the recent rise in income inequality. Should aid be given to single parents? On
the one hand, this helps to lift many singleparent households out of poverty and aids chil-
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dren, while on the other hand it might promote
an increase in the number of single households with children. This leads to the last
question. How much insurance is provided
within a family when their members are hit by
earnings or health shocks? While traditionally
taxes and transfers have been the key tools of
social insurance, making the female labor supply more flexible, as a result of, for example,
better child care arrangements, could be an effective policy tool as well. These are difficult
questions for which modern macroeconomic
models are well suited.
Another avenue for future research is to
study further how children’s preferences are
formed. In particular, young adults’ attitudes
about leisure, work, and time preference are
important. Economic theory predicts that individuals who place a low weight on leisure
and who have a low rate of time preference
will work more, accumulate more human capital and wealth, and invest more in their health.
Thus, these factors could play a role in determining poverty and its intergenerational transmission. Rich parents instill a different set of
ideals in their kids than poor parents. How
parents, peer groups, and social institutions,
such as schools, affect children’s preferences
is important to study. As was discussed, research shows that the amount of shame a child
feels about engaging in risky behavior has an
impact on their actions. So, such channels
matter.
The growing availability of data for the developing world also offers directions for future research. Existing models of familyrelated behavior have, to a large extent, been
constructed to understand today’s developed
countries and their past demographic and economic histories. Can these models confront
the data from developing countries? For example, the decline in fertility in developing
countries is much more rapid than what occurred in developed countries, as can be seen
from Figure 15. Is this due to more rapid
growth in income or are these transitions fundamentally different? Similar questions also
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arises for theories of women’s labor-force participation, marriage, divorce, sexual behavior,
etc. Can one use models built for developed
countries or are new ones needed? An answer
to this question is important for guiding development policies around the world.
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TABLE 1—U.S. C HILD -C ARE E XPENDITURE AS
P ERCENTAGE OF THE M OTHER ’ S I NCOME , 2011

Household Type
Marital Status
married
divorced
never married
Educ. of Mother
less than HS
HS
some Col.
Col+
Emp. of Mother
employed, full
employed, part
self-employed
Family Inc.
less than $1,500
$1,500-$2,999
$3,000-$4,499
$4,500 and over

A

Age of Child
< 5 5 to 14
22.2
19.9
26.1

14.4
11.6
15.3

34.2
29.0
23.2
21.1

22.3
18.5
15.9
12.3

20.9
30.5
35.8

13.3
19.3
17.7

46.6
27.9
29.7
20.8

39.3
20.2
18.2
12.6

Note: The sample comprises families with at least one child
under the age of 15 and with employed mothers that make
child-care payments for at least one of their children. The
numbers refer to total direct child-care expenditures and include expenditures on organized care (e.g. day care centers
or nurseries) and other non-relative care (e.g., family day
care or child care in the child’s home). For further detail,
see Laughlin (2013).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Who’s Minding the Kids?
Child Care Arrangements: 2011 – Detailed Tables, Table
6. The calculations are based on the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), 2008 Panel.

TABLE 2—T OTAL S PENDING ON A C HILD AS
A F RACTION OF H OUSEHOLD I NCOME IN THE
U NITED S TATES , 2013

Age
0-2
3-5
6-8
9-11
12-14
15-17

Age
0-2
3-5
6-8
9-11
12-14
15-17

Two-Parent Families
Household Income, $
< 61,530
61,530
>106,540
-106,540
(39,360)
(82,790) (186,460)
0.24
0.16
0.11
0.24
0.16
0.11
0.23
0.15
0.11
0.25
0.17
0.12
0.26
0.17
0.13
0.26
0.18
0.14
Single-Parent Families
Household Income, $
< 61,530 > 61,530
(27,290) (111,660)
0.30
0.16
0.33
0.17
0.32
0.17
0.35
0.17
0.36
0.18
0.35
0.19

Note: The calculations are based on the 2005-2006 Consumer Expenditure Survey and the amounts are updated to
2013 dollars by using the consumer price index. The sample consists of households with at least one child age 17 or
younger. The figures represent estimated expenses on the
younger child in a two-child family. Household expenditures include housing, food, transportation, clothing, health
care, child care and education, personal care, entertainment
and reading materials. The numbers in parentheses are mean
household income for the indicated income class.
Source: Lino (2014, Tables 1 and 7).
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TABLE 4—M ATCHING P ROCESS
TABLE 3—P UBLIC E XPENDITURE ON FAMILY
B ENEFITS IN OECD C OUNTRIES , P ERCENT OF
GDP, 2011

Cntry

Cash

Serv.

Tax

Total

Dnk
Fra
Fin
Deu
Ita
Nor
Esp
Swe
UK
USA

1.63
1.24
1.58
1.21
0.74
1.29
0.54
1.49
2.60
0.09

2.42
1.69
1.65
0.97
0.76
1.79
0.84
2.14
1.37
0.63

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.87
0.52
0.11
0.13
0.00
0.29
0.47

4.05
3.64
3.22
3.05
2.01
3.20
1.51
3.64
4.26
1.19

Child
Care
0.68
0.58
0.84
0.06
0.18
0.88
0.56
1.06
0.41
0.06

Note: The table reports, as a fraction of GDP, public expenditure on child-related cash transfers to families, services
(in-kind transfers) for families with children, financial support for families provided through the tax system, and child
care. Public spending includes financial support that is exclusively for families with children. Spending recorded in
other social policy areas such as health and housing also assist families with children, but not exclusively so, and is not
included. The last column is total public spending on child
care and early (under age 5) education. Public expenditure
on child care and early educational services is all public financial support (in cash, in-kind or through the tax system)
for families with children participating in formal day-care
services (e.g. crèches, day-care centers and family day care
for children under 3) and pre-school institutions (including
kindergartens and day-care centers which usually provide an
educational content as well as traditional care for children
aged from 3 to 5, inclusive).
Source: OECD Family Database; (i) PF1.1, Public Spending on Family Benefits (Chart PF1.1A); and (ii) PF3.1,
Public Spending on Childcare and Early Education (Chart
PF3.1.A).

Rank
1
::
:

Match
.2; 2; 2/
::
:

k
::
:
8

.i; j; h/
::
:
.1; 1; 1/

Odds
22

::
:
k . /; R k . ;
minfRm
i
j
f
::
:
k . /; R k . ;
minfRm
1
1
f
D 11

h /g

1 /g

Note: In the second column, .i; j; h/ is shorthand for the
match . i ; j ; h ):

TABLE 5—U.S. C HILD W ELLBEING
S TRUCTURE

Relative Income
<High School
College
Teen Births
Idle, at age 19-21

1 Parent, %
51.4
14.6
15.0
32.8
25.9

BY

FAMILY

2 Parent, %
100
9.2
23.6
21.3
12.1

Note: See the main text for details.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 19682011
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TABLE 6—U.S. C HILD -C ARE T IME BY M OTHERS ,
H OURS PER W EEK

Year
1965
1975
1985
2003
2013
1965
1975
1985
2003
2013

> Col.

Col. Unmar.
Total
8.56
10.81
6.02
7.73
7.38
6.80
7.65
8.82
5.76
12.51 16.39
11.14
13.00 15.63
11.51
Per Child
3.38
5.09
2.82
4.02
3.63
3.98
4.67
5.38
3.72
7.24
9.63
7.38
7.76
9.39
7.42

Mar.
10.31
7.94
8.77
14.41
14.5
4.71
3.90
5.27
8.04
8.47

Note: The numbers in the upper panel are hours spent on total child care (primary, educational and play) by women. The
lower panel reports hours per week per child in the household. The sample is restricted to households with a child
present.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table II) updated with the
2004-2013 American Time Use Survey (ATUS).

TABLE 8—T HE P ERCENTAGE OF U.S. T EENAGE
G IRLS H AVING P REMARITAL S EX AS A F UNCTION
OF G UILT, M OTHER ’ S F EELINGS AND R ELIGION

Feel guilty from sex?
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
How would your mother feel?
Strongly disapprove
Disapprove
Neither approve or disapprove
Approve
Role of Religion
Very important
Fairly important
Fairly unimportant
Not important at all
Source:
(2014)

%
17
37
57
75
77
%
31
50
81
76
%
38
53
60
49

Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner

TABLE 7—S ELECTED U.S. W OMEN ’ S R IGHTS
M ILESTONES

Year
1920
1920
1936
1960
1963
1964
1964
1965
1969
1970
1972
1973
1978
1986

Event
19th Amendment
Women’s Bureau
U.S. v. One Package
Birth Control Pill
Equal Pay Act
Civil Rights Act, Title VII
EEOC
Griswold v. Connecticut
No Fault Divorce, California
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.
Title IX, Education Amendments
Roe v. Wade
Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

TABLE 9—TARGETED M OMENTS :
M ODEL

Moments
Var. of county income
Var. of household income
Adoption, 1940
TFR ratio
Coef, fert on adopt
Coef, 1 fert on 1 adopt

DATA

Model
0:17
0:37
0:38
1:25
0:32
0:17

AND

Data
0:17
0:35
0:35
1:28
0:35
0:17
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M ATHEMATICAL A PPENDIX
A1.

Proof of Proposition 1 (Married Female Labor Supply)

Consider an interior solution; i.e., assume that l f > 0. To begin with, the budget constraint
can be written as
1
lm C l f qd :
c D wf
Substituting the budget constraint and
dD

.1

1

/q

1

lm

.2

lf/

R.q/.2

lm

lf/

into the first-order condition for l f yields

1

lm C l f

R.q/.2

lm

l f /q

D

.1
/.1
/.2 lm l f / 1
[ [R.q/.2 lm l f /] C .1
/.2 lm

D

.1
/.1
/
[ R.q/ C .1
/].2 lm

lf/

lf/ ]

;

which can be rearranged to arrive at
(A1)

[ R.q/ C .1

/].2

lm

l f / D .1

/.1

1

/

lm C l f

R.q/q.2

lm

lf/ :

Using the above formula for d,
@ R.q/
D
@q

1
1

.

1

/

1
1

q

2
1

< 0;

and

1
1
@[R.q/q]
1
D
.
/ 1 q 1 < 0;
@q
1
since 0 < < 1. Hence, R.q/q is increasing in q. As a result, a lower q is associated with
an upward shift in the left-hand side of equation (A1). The right-hand side of equation (A1) is
increasing in q. Hence, a lower value of q is connected with a downward shift in the right-hand
side of equation (A1). Thus, the female labor supply must go up as a result of a lower q. It is
easy to deduce that l f is increasing in .

A2.

Nash Bargaining Solution

First consider the problem where the household maximizes a weighted sum of utilities
max

c;lm ;l f

[ ln.c/ C .1

/ ln.1

lm /] C .1

/[ ln.c/ C .1

subject to
c D wm l m C w f l f :

/ ln.1

l f /];
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Focus on the first-order condition for l f : It is given by
wf
D .1
c

(A2)

/.1

/

1
1

:

lf

Consider now the Nash bargaining problem with B and G as outside options for the man and
woman. It is given by
max f[ ln.c/ C .1

/ ln.1

c;lm ;l f

lm /

B]

[ ln.c/ C .1

/ ln.1

lf/

G]g:

The first-order condition for l f is now given by
2

2

1
ln.c/ w f C .1
c

1
/ ln.1
c

D .1

/ ln.c/

1
/ ln.1
c

l f /w f C .1
1
1

lf

C .1

/2 ln.1

1
wf G
c

lm /w f

lm /

1
1

.1

lf

/

1
wf B
c
1

1

lf

B;

which can be written as
wf
[2 ln.c/ C .1
/ ln.1 l f / C .1
/ ln.1
c
1
D .1
/
[ ln.c/ C .1
/.1 lm / B]:
1 lf

(A3)

lm /

B

G]

Let
1

D

[2 ln.c/ C .1

[ ln.c/ C .1
/.1
/ ln.1 l f / C .1

lm / B]
/ ln.1 lm /

B

G]

D

.H

H B
B/ C .W

G/

where W
ln.c/ C .1
/.1 l f / and H
ln.c/ C .1
/.1 lm /. It is immediate
that the first-order conditions in equations (A2) and (A3) are identical. Similar steps can be
followed to show that the first-order conditions for lm are also identical for these two problems
when D .W B/=[.H B/ C .W G/].
A3.

Proof of Lemma 1 (Household Allocations)

To start, define the size variable z as taking the value 1 for a single household and 2 for a
married one. Substitute out for c c and n in the objective functions for the single and married
households. Then maximize with respect to d and h to obtain the following two first-order
conditions (for z D 1; 2):
(A4)

c

c

wq D .1

/z

[ d C .1

/h ]

=

=

1

1

1

d

;

and
(A5)

c

c

w D .1

/z

[ d C .1

/h ]

.1

/h

1

:

;
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(The z subscript has been dropped on the endogenous variables to conserve on notation.) Next,
divide (A5) into (A4) and simplify to get
(A6)

.1

dDh

1=.

/q

1/

R.q/h:

Finally, by substituting (A6) and the household’s budget constraint into equation (A5), a single
equation in h arises (for z D 1; 2):
(A7)

R.q/ C .1

=

1

/

h1

D .1

/.1

h

/z

c
w

h

i
q R.q/h :

/.1

/z

.z

z

Proof of the Lemma—Rewrite equation (A7) as
=

/]1

[ R.q/ C .1

h C .1

h

/.1

/[1 C q R.q/]z

h

D .1

c=w/:

Now begin with Part (iii). If z increases by the factor > 1, then z c=w rises by the factor
. z c=w/=.z c=w/ > . Now the right-hand side rises by the factor
. Observe
that if h rises by the factor , then the left-hand side will increase by more than the factor
,
because
>
when < 0. Therefore, to restore equality between the left-hand and righthand sides of the above equation, h must rise by less than the factor . Next, Part (ii) is implied
by equation (A6) and Part (iii). By using Parts (ii) and (iii), in conjunction with the household’s
budget constraint, Part (i) arises. Part (iv) follows from Part (i) by noting that .c2 c/ 2.c1 c/,
since [.2 c=w/=.1 c=w/] 2. Thus, .c2 c/=2 .c1 c/, which implies c2 > c1 . Now, it
is feasible for a married household to choose c2 D 2c1 , d2 D 2d1 , and h 2 D 2h 1 . The fact they
didn’t implies that M.w; q/ > S.w; q/. Hence, Part (v) holds.

A4.

The Rise in Assortative Mating

In the setup used in Section 3.2, the married household’s first-order conditions are
c

wq D .1

j

D .1

/[ d C .1

/.

h h/

h h/

]

]

1

1

d

;

and
(A8)

c

w

/[ d C .1

/.

1

.1

/

hh

This now implies that

(A9)

dD

"

.1

/
j

hq

#1=.

1/

h

R.q/

j
h

1=.1

/
h h:

1

:
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Finally, by substituting equation (A9) and the household’s budget constraint into equation (A8),
a single equation in h arises:

j

D .1

"

=.1

j

R.q/
/.1

/

"

#

/

C .1

h

i

C

/ h

jh

j

1=.1

j

q R.q/

/
hh

h

#

:

This equation can be rearranged to achieve
hD

.1
.

j=

i/

R.q/

=.1

j

/

h

/.1

C .1

/.1 C

/ C .1

j= i/

/.1

/.

j=

i / 1 C q R.q/

j
h

Housework, h, is decreasing in the ratio of the wife’s productivity in the market to her productivity at home, j = h , and in the ratio of her productivity in the market to her husband’s, j = i .
A5.

Derivation of Equation 28

Consider equation (27) and divide through by e .1 C s=r / C w f .1 C gs=r /:
V1 .k/ C

sV1 .sk/

e 1C

1
C wf 1 C

s
r

gs
r

D U1 .c/ :

Multiply by lifetime income, which is given by the intertemporal budget constraint
cC

c0
D wm C w f
r

1C

h
s
gs i
k e 1C
C wf 1 C
r
r

g
r

to obtain
V1 .k/ C

sV1 .sk/

"

wm C w f

e 1C

s
r

1C

#

g
r

C wf 1 C

k D U1 .c/ c C

gs
r

c0
:
r

Using the Euler equation, U1 .c/ D rU1 c0 ; to rewrite the right-hand side as U1 .c/ c C
U1 c0 c0 , assuming e D 0, and rearanging the left-hand side yields
V1 .k/ C

sV1 .sk/

"

1

1C

A6.

wf
wm

1

!

gCr
gs C r

#

k D U1 .c/ c C U1 c0 c0 :

Proof of Proposition 11

The optimization problem can be written
maxfF .k; c/ D U .c/ C U c0 C V .k/ C
k;c

V .sk/g;

=.1

/

:
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subject to
c0 D r W

k r x C x 0s ;

rc

0 C w 0 =r is the household’s total wealth, and x
wm C w f C wm
f

where W

e C wf

w0f

x0

represent the current and future cost of a child. Assume that sV1 .sk/ is a
and
eC
non-increasing function of s. This implies
V1 .sk/ C skV11 .sk/

0:

At a maximum for F, the following first- and second-order conditions must hold:
Fk ; Fc
Fkk ; Fcc
2
Fkk Fcc Fkc

D 0;
< 0;
1 > 0:

These derivatives are
Fk
Fc
Fkk
Fcc
Fkc

U1 c0 r x C sx 0 C V1 .k/ C

D

sV1 .sk/ ;

0

rU1 c ;

D U1 .c/

0

r x C sx 0

2

s 2 V11 .sk/ ;

C V11 .k/ C

D

U11 c

D

rU11 c0 r x C sx 0 :

D U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0 ;

The discriminant, 1, is given by
1D

h

U11 c0 r x C sx 0

2

C V11 .k/ C

s 2 V11 .sk/

ih
i
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0
. r /2 U11 c0

2

r x C sx 0

2

;

which simplifies to
1D

h

V11 .k/ C

s 2 V11 .sk/

ih
i
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0 C U11 c0 r x C sx 0

2

U11 .c/ :

Note also the following derivatives
Fks
Fcs

D
D

U11 c0 r x C sx 0 kx 0
0

0

rU11 c kx :

U1 c 0 x 0 C

V1 .sk/ C

skV11 .sk/ ;

T HE SIGN OF dk=ds
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to c, k and s yields
Fkk
Fck

Fck
Fcc

dk=ds
D
dc=ds

Fks
:
Fcs
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Cramer’s rule states that

dk
Fks Fck
:
D1 1
Fcs Fcc
ds
Let X represent the determinant in the above expression, which can be written as
X

U1 c 0 x 0 C

U11 c0 r x C sx 0 kx 0

D

C . r /2 U11 c0

2

V1 .sk/ C

skV11 .sk/

kx 0 r x C sx 0 ;

i
h
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0

or
U1 c 0 x 0 C

XD

V1 .sk/ C

skV11 .sk/

U11 c0 r x C sx 0 kx 0 U11 .c/ :

i
h
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0

Recall that V1 .sk/ C skV11 .sk/
0 by assumption. It follows that the first bracketed term is
negative. Hence X < 0, and dk=ds < 0.

T HE SIGN OF d.sk/=ds

Establishing that d.sk/=ds > 0 is equivalent to showing that
elasticity of k with respect to s is
dk s
8s
D
;
ds k
1k
where
8 D

XD

U1 c 0 x 0 C

V1 .sk/ C

skV11 .sk/

C U11 c0 r x C sx 0 kx 0 U11 .c/ :

dk=ds

s=k < 1. Now, the

h
i
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0

Note that 8 D X > 0. The objective is to prove that jdk=ds s=kj < 1, which amounts to
demonstrating that 8s 1k < 0. Consider the difference 8s 1k:
8s

1k

U1 c 0 x 0 C

D

V1 .sk/ C

skV11 .sk/

h
i
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0 s

C U11 c0 r x C sx 0 kx 0 U11 .c/ s
ih
i
h
V11 .k/ C
s 2 V11 .sk/ U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0 k

or
8s

1k

D

U1 c 0 x 0 s C

sV1 .sk/

kV11 .k/

r x U11 c0 r x C sx 0 U11 .c/ k:

U11 c0 r x C sx 0

h
i
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0

2

U11 .c/ k;
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U1 c0 sx 0 D U1 c0 r x

The first-order condition Fk D 0 implies
The difference 8s 1k then becomes
8s

1k

D

U1 c 0 r x

V1 .k/

kV11 .k/

r x U11 c0 r x C sx 0 U11 .c/ k:

V1 .k/

sV1 .sk/.

i
h
U11 .c/ C r 2 U11 c0

Recall that V1 .k/ C kV11 .k/
0 by assumption. It follows that the first-bracketed term is
positive. Hence 8s 1k < 0 and
dk s
< 1:
ds k
A7.

Elasticities of Substitution,

ck

and

ek

Consider the preferences described in equation (29). The elasticity of substitution between
the number of children, k, and consumption, c, is determined below, as well as the elasticity of
substitution between k and expenditures on quality, e.
C ONSUMPTION AND F ERTILITY,

ck

Holding expenditures, e , constant, an indifference curve in the .c; k/ plane is represented by
d ln .c/ D

k V1 .k/
d ln .k/ :
c U1 .c/

This implies
k V1 .k/
d ln .k/ :
c U1 .c/
Consider the marginal rate of substitution, V1 .k/ =U1 .c/. Taking derivatives implies
d ln .c=k/ D

d ln

V1 .k/
U1 .c/

D
D

1C

V11 .k/
U11 .c/
kd ln .k/
cd ln .c/
V1 .k/
U1 .c/
U11 .c/ V1 .k/
V11 .k/
kd ln .k/ C
k
d ln .k/ :
V1 .k/
U1 .c/ U1 .c/

Therefore,
ck

D

d ln .c=k/
d ln .V1 .k/ =U1 .c//

D

1C

V11 .k/
V1 .k/ k

C

k V1 .k/
c U1 .c/
:
U11 .c/ V1 .k/
U1 .c/ U1 .c/ k

E XPENDITURES ON Q UALITY AND F ERTILITY,

ek

Holding expenditures, c , constant, an indifference curve in the .e; k/ plane is represented by
d ln .e/ D

k V1 .k/
d ln .k/ ;
e J1 .e/
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implying
k V1 .k/
d ln .k/ :
e J1 .e/
Consider the marginal rate of substitution, . = / V1 .k/ =J1 .e/. Taking derivatives implies
d ln .e=k/ D

d ln

V1 .k/
J1 .e/

D
D

1C

V11 .k/
J11 .e/
kd ln .k/
ed ln .e/
V1 .k/
J1 .e/
V11 .k/
J11 .e/ V1 .k/
kd ln .k/ C
k
d ln .k/ :
V1 .k/
J1 .e/ J1 .e/

Hence,
ek

D
D

A8.

d ln .e=k/
d ln .V1 .k/ =J1 .e//
1C

V11 .k/
V1 .k/ k

C

k V1 .k/
e J1 .e/
J11 .e/ V1 .k/
J1 .e/ k J1 .e/

:

Proof of Proposition 12 (Productivity and the Quality-Quantity Tradeoff)

Rearranging the first-order conditions (31) and (32), while making use of (30), gives
V1 .k/ =J1 .e/
D 1 C w=e and
e=k

V1 .k/ =U1 .c/
D w=c
c=k

Logging and then taking the total differential of the two expressions yields
.1=

ek

1/ d ln .e=k/ D

.1=

ck

1/ d ln .c=k/ D

d .w=e/ ;
1 C w=e
1
d .w=c/ :
w=c 1

This can be rearranged into
(A10)

.1=

ek

1/ d ln .e=k/ D

(A11)

.1=

ck

1/ d ln .c=k/ D

d ln .e=w/ ;
e=w C
1
d ln .c=w/ :
1 c=w

Note also that
d ln .e=k/ D d ln .e=w/ C d ln .w/
d ln .c=k/ D d ln .c=w/ C d ln .w/

d ln .k/
d ln .k/ :

1:
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Thus, the system (A10)-(A11) can be rewritten as
(A12)

(A13)

1=

1=

ek

ck

1C

1C

d ln .e=w/

e=w C

.1=

1/ d ln .k/

ek

D

1
d ln .c=w/
1 c=w

.1=

.1=

ek

1/ d ln .w/ ;

.1=

ck

1/ d ln .w/ :

1/ d ln .k/

ck

D
The budget constraint (30) can be used to write
d ln .k/ D

(A14)

c=w
d ln .c=w/
1 c=w

e=w
d ln .e=w/ :
e=w C

Subsituting equation (A14) into the system (A12)-(A13) leads to the following formulation:
"

1=

ek

e=w
1/ e=wC

1 C e=wC C .1= ek
e=w
.1= ck 1/ e=wC

1=

.1=
1C 1

ck

ek
1
c=w

1/ 1 c=w
c=w
C .1= ck

1/ 1 c=w
c=w

#

d ln .e=w/ =d ln .w/
d ln .c=w/ =d ln .w/
D

.1=
.1=

ek
ck

1/
1/

:

Let 1 denote the discriminant of this system. The second-order conditions of the optimization
problem imply that, at a maximum, 1 > 0: Applying Cramer’s rule to this system, one finds
(A15)

d ln .e=w/
D
d ln .w/

1

1

.1=

ek

1/ 1=

ck

1C

d ln .c=w/
D
d ln .w/

1

1

.1=

ck

1/ 1=

ek

1C

1
;
1 c=w

and
(A16)

e=w C

:

Substituting these equations into (A14) yields
d ln .k/
1 c
D
.1=
d ln .w/
1w c

ck

1/ 1=

ek
ek

w

c
1 ek
C
.1=
1w c

ek

1/ 1=

ck

C

c
w

c

:
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Proof of Proposition 13 (The effect of productivity growth on fertility)

Preferences are represented by ln .c/ C ln .k/ C H .gw Q .e//. The first-order conditions
for c and k imply =k D .e C w/ =c. It follows, then, from the budget constraint (30) that
c D w= .1 C / and
(A17)

kD

1C

w
:
eC w

The optimization problem then becomes equivalent to maxe H .gw Q .e//
the following first-order condition:
(A18)

.gw/1

Q .e/

Q 1 .e/ D

eC w

ln .e C w/, with

:

Write this first-order condition as A .e; g/ B .e/ D 0, and note that the second-order condition
for a maximum implies A1 .e; g/ B1 .e/ < 0: Implicitly differentiating with respect to e and g
yields
de
A2 .e; g/
D
;
dg
A1 .e; g/ B1 .e/
where A2 .e; g/ D .1
w1 Q .e/ Q 1 .e/. Thus, the sign of de=dg, and hence
/g
d Q.e/=dg D Q 1 .e/ de=dg, is the same as the sign of A2 .e; g/. The result for fertility follows
from the observation that k is decreasing in e, as indicated by equation (A17).
A10.

Measures of Fertility

There are many measures of fertility. To review them, define ki;t as the average number of
children born to a woman of age i during year t:
ki;t D

Number of births to women of age i
:
Number of women of age i
f

This is a first measure known as the Age-Specific Fertility Rate. Let pi;t denote the denominator
m denote
of this ratio, that is, the total number of women of age i during year t: Similarly, let pi:t
the total number of men. Another measure of fertility is the Crude Birth Rate
X

Crude Birth Ratet D X

i

f
k p
i i;t i;t
f
m
pi;t C pi;t

;

which is simply the number of birth per population during a particular period of time. A third
measure, the General Fertility Rate, reports births per women in their child-bearing period during
a particular time:
X49
f
k p
iD15 i;t i;t
:
General Fertility Ratet D X49
f
p
i;t
iD15
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These are measures of contemporaneous fertility. Two additional measures deal with lifetime
fertility. The Total Fertility Rate measures the number of children a woman would have over the
course of her fertile life if she experienced the current Age-Specific Fertility Rates throughout
her life. For women 15 years of age at date t, the Total Fertility Rate is
Total Fertility Ratet D

X49

k :
iD15 i;t

Note, again, that the total fertility rate at time t is built from the Age-Specific Fertility Rate
observed at time t. A 15-year-old woman at time t may not experience at age 16—that is,
at date t C 1—the same Age-Specific Fertility Rate that a 16-year-old experiences at time t.
That is, kiC1;tC1 may differ from ki;t . Thus, the Total Fertility Rate measures the fertility of
an “imaginary” woman who would experience throughout the rest of her life the current AgeSpecific Fertility Rates of each age group. The Total Fertility Rate is useful to build projections
about the lifetime fertility of a young cohort, assuming that Age-Specific Fertility Rates will
remain constant. For women past their childbearing years, it is possible to construct a final
measure, the Completed Fertility Rate for a woman born at date t:
Completed Fertility Ratet D
This is a measure of realized lifetime fertility.

X49

k
iD15 i;tCi:

